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CENTERING THE TEENAGE “SIREN”:
ADOLESCENT WORKERS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT,
AND THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE AND GENDER

nastasia . oles*
ABSTRACT
Recent scholarship and media attention has focused on the
prevalence of sexually harassing behavior directed at working teenagers, and the emergence of sexual harassment lawsuits by these minors
against their employers. Although many of the legal issues concerning workplace sexual harassment and adult workers (and the various
state and federal jurisprudence prohibiting it) have been widely discussed, there is surprisingly little discourse, research, and precedent
addressing the problem of workplace sexual harassment and teen
workers.
Currently, most sexual harassment cases brought by adolescent
workers are litigated using the doctrinal framework for adult workers. Only the Seventh Circuit has developed an adolescent-specific
framework, and it produces the same result as the law governing
adult workers—it functions to maintain historically subordinating
racial and gender hierarchies embedded in sexual harassment law.
This Article uses legal construction to evaluate the developing law of
sexual harassment claims brought by adolescent workers. Absent a
deconstruction framework, adolescent-specific sexual harassment law
will continue to perpetuate the very racial and gender subordination
Title VII was passed to remediate.
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INTRODUCTION
Natasha1 was a 16-year-old high-school junior in September 2005
when Terence Davis recruited her to work for Taco Bell in Memphis, Tennessee. Davis, who was 34 years old at the time, was a store manager at the
fast-food restaurant. Davis began sexually harassing Natasha soon after her
employment began: he would tell Natasha she was “sexy,” make explicit
gestures with his fingers and mouth simulating oral sex, and brush up
against her when walking by. Natasha complained to a senior male em1. In an effort to protect the victims’ privacy, I have used the names “Natasha” and
“Jennifer” as pseudonyms. The facts are summarized here from public documents
filed in E.E.O.C. v. Taco Bell Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 884 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).
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ployee at the store, but the harassment continued until that November,
when Natasha’s family moved to a new neighborhood and she requested a
transfer to a new location. Soon after the move, Davis called Natasha to
request her new address in order to provide her final paycheck. He discovered she was at home alone from school ill. Minutes later, Davis knocked at
Natasha’s front door, forced his way in, and forcibly raped her. Natasha did
not report the rape to Taco Bell management or to the police, nor did she
return to work at Taco Bell. A few months later, Davis sent Natasha a text
message threatening to rape her again if she did not consent to a sexual
relationship with him.
Just months later, in April 2006, Davis sexually assaulted Jennifer, another adolescent woman, on her first day of work. While Jennifer was retrieving some vegetables, Davis blocked the door to the restaurant’s cooler,
preventing her exit. He began kissing her, placing his tongue down her
mouth, fondling her breasts and buttocks, and penetrating her genitalia
with his fingers. He then suggested they meet in the restaurant restroom to
have sex. As soon as Davis let her out of the cooler, Jennifer ran out of the
restaurant. She soon noticed that Davis was following her in his car. Jennifer
asked a few young men standing nearby to walk her home. Once she got
home, Jennifer’s mother called the police. After the attack, Jennifer’s mother
decided to move her to a new neighborhood and school because Jennifer
did not want to pass the Taco Bell location where she was attacked. She
underwent counseling, suffered from depression, had problems with anger
management, and her grades dropped at school.
Jennifer filed a sexual harassment charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); the agency filed an enforcement suit
against Taco Bell in September 2007.2 During its investigation of Jennifer’s
harassment and assault allegations, the EEOC discovered Davis’ unreported
rape of Natasha. The EEOC amended its complaint against Taco Bell to
seek relief on behalf of both Jennifer and Natasha. Eventually, Davis was
criminally prosecuted for his attacks on Natasha and Jennifer. Although
Tennessee recognizes the crime of statutory rape, Davis pled guilty to forcibly raping Natasha.3 Natasha became pregnant after the assault; court-or2. Jennifer later intervened in the enforcement suit and entered into a private settlement with Taco Bell before trial. Motion for Leave to Intervene, EEOC v. Taco Bell
Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 884 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (No. 2:07-cv 02579), ECF No. 2
(requesting permission of court to enter lawsuit as a party-plaintiff); Stipulation of
Dismissal With Prejudice, EEOC v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 2:07-cv 02579, 2009 WL
5071663 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2009) (stipulating for dismissal due to private settlement on August 14, 2009).
3. General Sessions Criminal Court Case Status History for Terence Davis, SHELBY
COUNTY GENERAL SESSIONS AND CRIMINAL COURT CASE INFORMATION
DATABASE, http://jssi.shelbycountytn.gov/ (follow “GS Case History” hyperlink;
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dered DNA testing confirmed that the baby belonged to Davis. She later
dropped out of high school, in part due to the emotional trauma of the
assault, and in part due to the difficulties balancing adolescent motherhood
and her education.
Taco Bell’s litigation strategy was clear. Natasha was portrayed as a
sexually promiscuous liar with a tainted criminal history. She was incapable
of experiencing workplace sexual harassment. She was undeserving of a legal
remedy. Despite Davis’ guilty plea to forcible rape and sexual battery, Taco
Bell defended the litigation, in part, by claiming Natasha was lying about
the sexual assault and characterizing the sexual encounter with Davis as consensual. At one point during her deposition, Natasha emphasized, “I didn’t
have sex with him. He raped me.”4 Taco Bell attorneys obtained deposition
testimony from Natasha that she was not a virgin prior to being raped by
Davis; she admitted having a sexual relationship with another teenage boy.
Defense attorneys also sought to introduce extensive evidence of Natasha’s
juvenile criminal history, including her guilty plea to a misdemeanor shoplifting charge committed years after the attack, evidence that she spent a
night in a juvenile detention facility as a teenager, and evidence that she was
involved in an unrelated assault incident. The EEOC and Taco Bell settled
the case before trial, and Taco Bell entered into a consent decree.
Unfortunately, Natasha and Jennifer’s experience with workplace sexual harassment is common but relatively uncharted. Recent studies suggest
that adolescent workers experience sexual harassment at much higher rates
than their adult counterparts.5 Media focus on the issue is increasing,6 as are
then follow “Arrest by RNI” hyperlink; then enter case RNI number “267073”; then
follow Indictment No. “06 06292” hyperlink). Compare TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39–13–503 (Westlaw through end of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess.) (criminal offense of rape is a Class B felony), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (Westlaw
through end of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess.) (aggravated statutory rape, a Class D
felony, is a lesser offense).
4. Motion in Limine to Exclude Documents and Testimony Regarding Motel Registry
Card, EEOC v. Taco Bell Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 884 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (No.
2:07-cv 02579), ECF No. 103–3 (emphasis added).
5. See Susan Fineran, Adolescents at Work: Gender Issues and Sexual Harassment, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 953 (2002); Susan Fineran & James E. Gruber, Youth at
Work: Adolescent Employment and Sexual Harassment, 8 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
550 (2009).
6. See. e.g., Laura Gunderson, Young Workers Least Likely to Find Help, Yet Suffer Deepest
Scars: Teen Sexual Harassment, THE OREGONIAN, Apr. 1, 2014, available at 2014
WLNR 8795305 [hereinafter Gunderson, Deepest Scars]; Laura Gunderson, Teen
Sexual Harassment: Oregon Labor Commissioner Says Young Workers Vulnerable, THE
OREGONIAN, Mar. 31, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 8692527; NOW on PBS: Is
Your Daughter Safe At Work?, (PBS television broadcast Feb. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/508/; E.J. Graff, Is Your Daughter Safe At Work?,
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, June 2007, at 162, available at http://www.goodhousekeep-
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federal and state efforts to identify and adjudicate sexual harassment claims
brought by teen workers. For example, in 2004, the EEOC launched Youth
@Work, an educational and enforcement litigation campaign that has resulted in an increase in enforcement suits on behalf of adolescent workers
alleging workplace sexual harassment claims.7 Despite the media and enforcement attention, however, relatively little legal scholarship has explored
the problem of workplace sexual harassment involving teenaged workers.8
Also common in sexual harassment litigation is Taco Bell’s litigation
strategy of portraying the victim of sexual harassment as undeserving or
otherwise unworthy of legal protection. Indeed, sexual harassment law has
developed in a way that allocates legal protection more on the basis of vicing.com/family/parenting-tips/daughter-safe-work-jun07; Donna Koehn, Innocence
Lost, TAMPA TRIB., June 11, 2006, at 1; Dana Knight, Sexual Harassment and Bias
Complaints Surging Among the Young, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 14, 2005, at D1;
H.J. Cummins, Workplace Often Ugly for Young Women: ‘U’ Study Finds One-Third of
Those 14 to 26 are Sexually Harassed, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 1,
2004, at 1D.
7. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Launches “Youth@
Work” Initiative to Educate Teen Employees About Their Rights and Responsibilities (Sept. 21, 2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/archive/9-21-04a
.html [hereinafter EEOC Youth@Work Press Release]. See generally Youth@Work,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/youth//index
.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC Youth@Work homepage] (providing youth in the workforce with information on their legal rights and responsibilities as an employee).
8. Indeed, only one scholar, Prof. Jennifer Ann Drobac, has examined the legal issues
relating to adolescent workers and sexual harassment in depth. See, e.g., Jennifer Ann
Drobac, Sex and the Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and a Conflict of Laws, 79
WASH. L. REV. 471 (2004) [hereinafter Drobac, Sex and the Workplace]; Jennifer
Ann Drobac, “Developing Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” At Work, At Law, and in the
Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1 (2006); Jennifer Ann
Drobac, I Can’t to I Kant: The Sexual Harassment of Working Adolescents, Competing
Theories, and Ethical Dilemmas, 70 ALB. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter Drobac, I
Can’t to I Kan’t]; Jennifer Ann Drobac, Wake Up and Smell the Starbucks Coffee: How
Doe v. Starbucks Confirms the End of “The Age of Consent” in California and Perhaps
Beyond, 33 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2013); Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the
Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers, and the Sting to “the Age of Consent”, 20 J.L. &
POL’Y 63 (2011); Jennifer Ann Drobac & Leslie A. Hulvershorn, The Neurobiology of
Decision Making in High-Risk Youth and the Law of Consent to Sex, 17 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 502 (2014); see also Seymour Moskowitz, Save the Children: The Legal Abandonment of American Youth in the Workplace, 43 Akron L. Rev. 107, 127–31 (2010)
(discussing susceptibility of adolescent female workers to sexual harassment due to
their developmental stage, nature of employment, and power imbalance). Professor
Drobac argues that employers of adolescent workers should be held strictly liable for
sexual harassment claims brought by young workers, and any consent given by the
underage worker to sexual contact is voidable. See Drobac, Sex and the Workplace,
supra at 543–45.
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tim characteristics than the victim’s actual experience with workplace sexual
harassment.9 Taco Bell sought to convince the court, and eventually the
jury, that Natasha was not the type of young woman who deserved legal
protection from sexual harassment.
To fully understand Natasha’s experience with litigating her sexual
harassment claim, and specifically why Taco Bell hinged its defense strategy
on attacking her character, one must examine how constructions of race and
gender shape sexual harassment doctrine. It is not clear from the court documents whether Natasha, or Jennifer, is a young woman of color.10 Indeed,
absent a corollary claim for racial discrimination or explicit references to a
target’s racial identity in the evidence of harassment, the axis of race is typically absent from the text of the court opinions that shape sexual harassment
law. Yet historical constructions of race and gender are invisibly but prominently embedded in the doctrine11—controlling images12 of virtuous White
women are juxtaposed against images of vile women of color.13 In turn, the
law functions to reinforce and continue the construction of race and gender,
9. See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES 62 (2005).
10. Critical legal scholarship is rich with discourse concerning the compound barriers
women of color confront in the experience of workplace sexual harassment, in reporting the harassment, and in seeking a legal remedy. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467 (1992)
(discussing how pervasive stereotypes of black women shape the types of sexual harassment they experience and whether their stories are likely to be believed); Maria L.
Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817 (1993) (suggesting the indivisibility of race and
gender in sexual harassment can be understood by looking at the harassment from
the perspectives of the harasser, the victim, and the judicial system); Sumi K. Cho,
Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority
Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177 (1997) (discussing how the
converging racial and gender stereotypes of Asian Pacific American women as being
politically passive and sexually exotic and compliant racialized sexual lead to “racialized sexual harassment”); Tanya Katerı́ Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2006) (examining the racial disparity in internal reports of
sexual harassment and formal sexual harassment charges).
11. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionalist
Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 633–34 (2002) (citing Daniel Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79
VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836, 1838, 1847 (1993)).
12. I use Patricia Hill Collins’ concept of “controlling images” to focus on “the process
by which certain assumed qualities . . . are used to justify oppression.” PATRICIA
HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND
THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 68 (1991).
13. Tanya Katerı́ Hernández, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 185 (2001) (arguing
that both sexual harassment and international sex tourism import racialized stereotypes of women).
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thus sustaining racial and gender subordination.14 Antidiscrimination doctrine, generally, and the law of sexual harassment, specifically, have functioned together as a perpetuating and stabilizing force of reinforcing racial
and gender hierarchies.15 The law of sexual harassment functioned to allow
Natasha’s portrayal as a thieving, promiscuous liar incapable of being sexually harmed by a manager twenty years her senior when forcibly raped.
Whether Natasha was a young woman of color does not actually matter;
during the litigation she was treated as one.
This Article explores the legal construction of race and gender in sexual harassment law.16 I posit that sexual harassment jurisprudence in the
United States has imported the constructions of race and gender to the
point that the two are interdependent. The current doctrinal framework
used to adjudicate sexual harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is premised upon societal norms, racialized stereotypes,
hegemonic goals, racism, and sexism. Legal rules and tests used today to
determine who is and who is not entitled to legal relief are tightly bound
with the constructions of race and gender commenced in the antebellum
south, solidified during the passage of Title VII, and continuing now as
precedent. Laws act in a hegemonic way to ensure the permanency of race
and gender hierarchies.
14. Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 314 (1996) (“Indeed, through the rigid construction
of the virgin/whore dichotomy along racial lines, the conception of womanhood was
deeply wedded to slavery and patriarchy and the conduct of all women was policed
in accordance with patriarchal norms and in furtherance of white male power.”).
15. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (analyzing cases in which black female
employees alleging workplace discrimination were denied relief because they did not
conform to the law’s classification requirements of discrimination based on “race” or
“sex” but rather alleged the intersectionality of these two immutable characteristics
was the cause of the discrimination); Hernández, supra note 13, at 196 (arguing that
all sexual harassment is “racialized” sexual harassment because even when male peers
or supervisors sexually harass white women to maintain the masculine domain of the
workplace, they are being treated like women of color).
16. Several highly influential critical race scholars have examined the ways in which law
operates as an affirmative force upon, rather than simply a reflection of, the social
construction of race and gender. See, e.g., Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1725 (1993) (“The law’s construction of whiteness defined
and affirmed critical aspects of identity (who is white); of privilege (what benefits
accrue to that status); and, of property (what legal entitlements arise from that status).”). This Article uses and examines Ian Haney López’s articulation of “legal construction” as one way of distinguishing the role of law in establishing and
maintaining socially constructed racial and gender hierarchies. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 123–24 (1996).
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Specifically, this Article uses legal constructionism to explore the developing jurisprudence concerning sexual harassment and adolescent workers. Given the problematic legal construction of race and gender, I argue
that it is inappropriate to import those constructions in the evolving legal
framework for adjudicating sexual harassment claims brought by adolescent
workers. In order to truly protect adolescent workers like Natasha and Jennifer, courts must be willing to depart from traditional sexual harassment
doctrine.17 Only a focused approach on dismantling race and gender hierarchies, as part of what I call a “deconstruction framework,” will realize the
goal of Title VII to remediate discrimination based on sex and race.18 Only
after rebuilding the foundation can we delve into the complicated issues of
adolescent workplace sexual harassment.
An examination of how race and gender directly affect the work and
legal experience of adolescent workers experiencing workplace sexual harassment or adjudicating claims of sexual harassment is beyond the scope of this
Article. Despite the EEOC’s Youth@Work initiative, the agency does not
track sexual harassment charges of Title VII violations by age and race. To
date, there is no published social science data on adolescent workers, race,
and sexual harassment. Yet the law is at work—stabilizing and constructing
racial and gender hierarchies—even in the absence of explicit racial references in the sexual harassment cases involving adolescent workers.
The task of dismantling the legal construction of race and gender in
cases involving adolescent workers is a formidable one, but the danger of the
current framework is not hypothetical. At present, the Seventh Circuit is the
only circuit that has adolescent-specific sexual harassment doctrine. The
first published opinion setting workplace sexual harassment precedent specific to adolescent workers is the Seventh Circuit opinion in Doe v. Oberweis
Dairy.19 The Oberweis Dairy court took the radical step of altering the
prima facie case for hostile work environment claims brought by teenaged
workers.20 The court held a jurisdiction’s age of consent should be used as a
proxy for when a worker can “welcome” sexual harassment.21
At first glance, the Oberweis Dairy decision is promising. However, the
Seventh Circuit proceeded to carve out a seemingly small distinction with
17. Courts must be at the front line of deconstruction. Litigants are not well situated to
fully address deconstruction arguments. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 636–37 (exploring difficulty in making social constructionist arguments from litigant’s
perspective).
18. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back
to Look Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1349 (2011).
19. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006).
20. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713.
21. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713.
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profound practical impact—if there is evidence that the adolescent worker
was a “siren,”22 then that evidence could be used to reduce the worker’s
damages. Stated differently, if there is evidence that the teen worker was
promiscuous, seduced her attacker, was not a virgin, dressed provocatively,
spoke provocatively, or otherwise signaled she was sexually available, her
monetary recovery could be reduced or completely barred. Given the endorsement of an adolescent worker’s “siren”-like qualities as relevant evidence, the “siren” exception effectively eviscerates any protection of the
Oberweis Dairy holding and contradicts its purpose. The “siren” exception
in Oberweis Dairy is therefore a poignant contemporary example of how the
law revitalizes and stabilizes racial and gender hierarchies in legal doctrine.23
Part I of this Article examines the legal construction of race and gender in the development of hostile work environment sexual harassment law.
I argue that the law has constructed race and gender from slavery, through
the passage of Title VII, and to the development of Supreme Court precedent limiting the ability of all plaintiffs bringing sexual harassment claims.
This section emphasizes legal construction as a perpetuating force of race
and gender hierarchies that support the current justification for excluding
“unworthy” workers from protection against sexual harassment.
Part II explores the current research on the sexual harassment of working adolescents and its deleterious effects. The section concludes with research supporting the need for increased focus on protecting all working
adolescents from workplace harassment and the need for special legal rules
to adjudicate claims brought by adolescent workers.
Part III demonstrates how the law has constructed race and gender in
the developing framework for adjudicating sexual harassment cases brought
by adolescent workers. The section focuses on the adolescent-specific framework in the Seventh Circuit following Oberweis Dairy, as well as trends in
other circuits.
Part IV briefly outlines a deconstruction framework for adjudicating
sexual harassment claims brought by adolescent workers that centers the
“siren.” Returning to Natasha’s story, I theorize how a deconstruction
framework could have affected her litigation experience. The article concludes by advocating broad use of the deconstruction framework to dismantle racial and gender hierarchies in sexual harassment doctrine and other
areas of the law.

22. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 715.
23. See Drobac, Sex and the Workplace, supra note 8, at 540.
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Race and gender are social constructions,24 not biological categories.25
That is, the categories of race and gender are what society makes them to
be. Suzanne Goldberg theorized:
Social construction arguments . . . focus on the process by which
traits are imbued with significance . . . these arguments contend
that identity categories are ‘social creations’ that ‘result from social belief and practice, are themselves complex social practices,
and may be evaluated in terms of whose interests they serve.26
In this way, both race and gender have been and will continue to be
socially “constructed.”
While a full examination of the historical construction of race and
gender is beyond the scope of this Article, it is critical to recognize that
inherent in the constructions of race and gender is the establishment of a
hierarchal structure meant to bolster “White” and “Male” and subordinate
the racial construction of “Black” and the gender construction of “Female.”
To say that race and gender are “socially constructed” is to examine the
multitude of historical and modern ways that these constructions maintain
racial and gender hierarchies. Thus, the process of “construction” is inherently hegemonic.
In addition to the social construction of race and gender, race and
gender are also “mutually constructed.”27 Throughout history, race has been
a necessary component of the social construction of gender, and vice versa.
In an important examination of the connection between the racial disparity
among victims of sexual harassment and the international sex tourism industry, Professor Tanya Kateri Hernández explores the deployment of race

24. I use the term “race” to refer to the social construction of race, and the term “gender” to focus on the social and legal construction of the arguably biological category
of “sex.” “Race” is commonly misused as a biological category, not a social construction. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1,
3–4 (2012).
25. There is agreement among modern scientists that there is no biological basis between
“races.” Id. at 29–30. Of course, race science did and still does serve to justify differential treatment based on race in the legal system and society in general. See id. at
17–30, for a discussion of the history of race science and its role in shaping the law.
26. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 635.
27. Hernández, supra note 13, at 209 (“Inasmuch as Whiteness is used to define the
masculine characteristic of autonomy and gender is implicated in who gets ‘treated
White,’ one can say that race and gender construct one another.”).

2015]

CENTERING THE TEENAGE “SIREN”

11

and gender constructions to subordinate both women and people of color
around the world:
In effect, White womanhood is constructed by its juxtaposition
with stereotypes of non-White women. Tagging Whiteness as
pure and racial difference as sexual is simultaneously implicated
in policing racial differences and notions of gender difference all
in the service of ‘hetero-sexist patriarchy.’
These stereotypes define true women as White women and true men
as White men, with rightful access for the latter to White women and illicit
access to women of color. In short, race and gender not only intersect—
they construct one another.28
Critical and outsider scholarship has focused on how the social construction of race and/or gender affects an employee’s experience with racial
and sexual discrimination/harassment in the workplace.29 Much of this important scholarship explicitly or implicitly incorporates the idea that race
and gender are socially constructed concepts.
Legal constructionism is particularly helpful in examining the antidiscrimination statutory scheme in Title VII. Though at least one of the
main goals of Title VII is anti-subordination, Title VII (and similar statutes)
has been used by litigants and courts in an affirmatively subordinating fashion, supplanting the very foundation of the statute. Race and gender have
been particularly vulnerable to the constructing force of law in employment
discrimination doctrine. Stepping away from the historical view of race and
gender as immutable biological categories and understanding the ways race
and gender are legally constructed allows a more effective and nuanced look
at how sexual harassment jurisprudence has developed to perpetuate, rather
than prevent and remediate, discrimination on the basis of race and gender.
By examining the way law has been and is deployed to maintain racial and
gender subordination through sexual harassment law,30 we can recognize
and hopefully dismantle those hierarchies in developing areas of
jurisprudence.
Ian F. Haney López argues there are three ways law as an ideology (as
opposed to a coercive force) operates to construct race: (1) reification, (2)
legitimization of socially constructed categories, and (3) helping social categories transcend their socio-historical development.31 This section analyzes
each theoretical concept and then applies it to the development of sexual
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 210–11.
See sources cited supra note 10.
See Hernández, supra note 13, at 214.
LÓPEZ , supra note 16, at 124, 126, 130.
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harassment doctrine. In short, this section argues that the legal construction
of race and gender in the development of hostile work environment sexual
harassment law has relied upon and imported a racialized and racist gender
hierarchy legally established and maintained during slavery, overtly formative in the inclusion of sex as a protected category in Title VII, and then
embedded in the Supreme Court’s recognition and subsequent interpretation of a cause of action for hostile work environment harassment.
A. Reification
Law reifies race and gender constructions, divorcing the consequences
of those constructions from hegemony and labeling them as usual, logical,
and ordinary. “To reify racial categories means to transform them into concrete things, making the categories seem natural, rather than human creations.”32 Negative controlling images are transformed into unchallenged
character traits confirmed by the environment. In this way, modern economic inequality is justified by the controlling image of lack of ambition,
not lack of opportunity or economic persecution. Lack of intelligence, not
segregation, justifies the achievement gap. And criminal propensity, not
mass incarceration, justifies racial disparities in the prison system. “The law
constructed ‘whiteness’ as an objective fact, although in reality it is an ideological proposition imposed through subordination. This move is the central feature of reification.”33
As an example, López powerfully illustrates how the legal structure
supporting segregation has created, sustained, and justified economic inequality and poverty:
. . . [T]he significance of legally mandated segregation does not
lie primarily in its power to police indeterminate identities
through neighborhood affiliation, though this should not be discounted. It lies instead in the power of segregation to create and
maintain the poverty and prosperity that society views as the results of innate racial character, rather than as predictable consequences of social and specifically legal discrimination.
[. . .] Race seems to explain, especially to Whites but also to
minorities, the pathology so evident on U.S. streets. On these
streets, racial differences seem fundamental, immutable, real and
self-evident, confirming not only the existence of races, but also
every negative suspicion about racial characteristics.34
32. Id. at 130.
33. Harris, supra note 16, at 1730.
34. LÓPEZ, supra note 16, at 132.

2015]

CENTERING THE TEENAGE “SIREN”

13

Once entrenched, simply repealing offending legislation does little to
hamper the reification process. The harm, having been legislated, enforced,
litigated, interpreted, and upheld is now part of the invisible societal foundation existing alongside conscious, unconscious, and structural racism and
sexism.35 Thus, Brown v. Board of Education,36 while formally outlawing
government-sanctioned segregation in education, could not itself reverse the
cycle of multi-generational economic and educational inequality. The legal
structure supporting inequities in public education, economic opportunity,
and employment persist, conveniently justified by controlling images of
Blacks as lazy and mentally incapable.37 The achievement gap in public education becomes inevitable and natural, instead of a direct accomplishment
of a system of laws and jurisprudence designed to deprive educational opportunities and resources from non-Whites.38 As Kimberlé Crenshaw has
observed, reification helps Whites legitimize subordination by affirming
that “those who should logically be on the bottom are on the bottom . . . if
Blacks are on the bottom, it must reflect their relative inferiority.”39
The poison of reification is that, over time, the underlying racial and
gender constructions have a ripple effect, animating additional harms that
are difficult to trace and even harder to remediate. Advocates of social
change are forced into discourse concerning “whether” racial and gender
hierarchies exist, and “where” the hierarchies originate. As time goes on, the
dialogue drifts further away from the work of “how” to dismantle racial and
gender hierarchies. As law reifies racial and gender constructions, de-construction of those constructions remains elusive.
Focusing on the law of sexual harassment, the American institution of
slavery is a useful point of departure when examining law’s power to construct race and gender through reification. Certainly, the notion that some
women are legally impervious to sexual violation is centuries old.40 The colonial distinction of a woman worthy of being a wife versus a woman worthy of servitude41 gave way to a sophisticated legal system legitimizing the
sexual exploitation of enslaved Black women.42 Cheryl Harris observed that
slavery “configured and structured social and legal boundaries of both race
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 133.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
LÓPEZ, supra note 16, at 132.
Id.
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimization in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1380 (1988).
40. Paula Giddings, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 34 (1984) (“After all, it had been accepted as far back as
Plato that women fell into three categories: whore, mistress, and wife . . .”).
41. Id.
42. See Harris, supra note 14, at 311–13.
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and gender,” and serves as “the primordial site of the production of racial
patriarchy.”43
Professor Adrienne Davis has argued that slavery should be viewed
both as a “sexual economy” and as an extreme form of sexual harassment.44
In characterizing slavery as a sexual economy, Davis examined two ways
enslaved women were sexually exploited for financial gain. First, slave
women gave birth to enslaved children who became the property of the
slave owner.45 Thomas Jefferson offered chilling words about the economic
value of a slave woman’s children to the slave owner when he wrote in 1819,
“I consider a woman who brings a child every two years as more profitable
than the best man on the farm; what she produces is an addition to capital.”46 Second, enslaved women were forced into sexual labor in service to a
broad client base—slave owners, relatives, friends, and business associates.47
Gerda Lerner poignantly wrote, “[t]he sexual exploitation of black women
by white men was so widespread as to be general.”48
Davis further argues that slavery was sexual harassment because it operated both as a mechanism of coerced sexual pleasure and control, indeed
“labor, sexual and racial control.”49 Slavery was “widespread, institutionalized, state-sanctioned sexual harassment implemented in perhaps its most
corrupt form.”50 Viewing slavery as both a sexual economy and sexual harassment allows us to understand the especially “brutal racial and gender
subordination” that slavery entailed.51
Importantly, understanding slavery as a sexual economy and as sexual
harassment deepens our understanding of how race and gender came to be
mutually constructed. “An enslaved woman might be socially constructed as
‘masculine’ for the purposes of productive work and brutal physical punishment, but very much a woman for the purposes of reproductive and sexual
43. Id.
44. See Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 457 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004).
45. See Adrienne D. Davis, “Dont Let Nobody Bother Yo’ Principle”: The Sexual Economy
of American Slavery, in SISTER CIRCLE: MEANINGS AND REPRESENTATIONS OF
BLACK WOMEN’S WORK 103, 105 (Sharon Harley et al. eds., 2002).
46. Id. at 109 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joel Yancy (Jan. 17, 1819), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON’S FARM BOOK: WITH COMMENTARY AND RELEVANT
EXTRACTS FROM OTHER WRITINGS 42, 43 (Edwin Morris Betts ed., 1953)).
47. Id. at 114.
48. BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 46 (Gerda Lerner
ed., 1972).
49. Davis, supra note 44, at 463.
50. Id. at 464.
51. Id.
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exploitation.”52 Black women were simultaneously sexually abused as
women, yet excluded from the construction of gender as “feminine”; enslaved women performed much of the same grueling work as enslaved
men.53 White women performing “non-feminine” work on the slave plantation usually did so out of necessity (she tended to be related to the plantation owner) or punishment.54 White women punished with fieldwork were
divested of the title of “woman.”55 Slavery thus converged the constructions
of race and gender; while White men, White women, and Black men engaged in labor aligned with gender roles, enslaved Black women did not.56
The role of sexuality within gender was also race-dependent. “Whereas the
lady was deprived of her sexuality, the black woman was defined by hers.”57
The legal structure supported slavery in every way. Slaves were defined
as property, not human, under the law.58 The law of partus sequitur ventrum
(“the child follows the mother”) required a child to inherit the enslaved or
free status of its mother, regardless of the father’s status; indeed, slaves were
considered fatherless.59 Enslaved black women could not legally be raped,
and were not legally considered women at all, but property.60 Nor could
slave testimony be used as evidence against a White person in court.61 After
52. Id. at 468.
53. Davis, supra note 45, at 106.
54. Id. at 107 (“In the eyes of colonial white Americans, only debased and degraded
members of the female sex labored in the fields.”).
55. Id. (citing BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 22
(1981)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 115 (quoting KATHERINE FISHURN, WOMEN IN POPULAR CULTURE: A REFERENCE GUIDE 10–11 (1982)).
58. Harris, supra note 16, at 1720.
59. Davis, supra note 45, at 108 (citing Frazier v. Spear, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 385, 386 (1811)
(“The father of a slave is unknown to our law.”) (citations omitted); see also Harris,
supra note 16, at 1719 (describing passage of Virginia law in 1662 requiring a slave
child to inherit the legal status of his mother).
60. See Davis, supra note 45, at 113 (discussing State v. George, 37 Miss. 316 (1859),
which overturned the rape conviction of an enslaved girl and legal commentator
Thomas Cobb’s agreement with the George court’s determination, writing “[t]he violation of the person of a female slave, carries with it no other punishment than the
damages which the master may recover for the trespass upon his property.”); see also
id. at 114 (noting that the majority of southern courts were in agreement with the
holding in State v. George).
61. Aaron Schwabach, Jefferson and Slavery, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 63, 71–72 (1997)
(describing laws regulating slaves in Virginia). The testimony of Black women is still
considered less credible in court. See, e.g., Linda Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies,
Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1066–67, 1067–68 n.229 (1995)
(discussing negative juror and judicial attitudes toward Black women victims and
witnesses and reviewing cases); Michèle Alexandre, “Girls Gone Wild” and Rape Law:
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the abolition of slavery, the law stabilized the racial and gender hierarchies
through Jim Crow laws, convict leasing, and the continued de-criminalization of violence against Black women and other women of color.62
Legal construction as reification helps explain how and why sexual
harassment doctrine has devolved in a way that supports, rather than supplants, race and gender hierarchies. The doctrine enforces a strict distinction
between those worthy of legal protection on one hand and those legally
incapable of experiencing sexual harm on the other. Having legitimized the
protected/unprotected distinction in the maintenance of and justification
for the institution of slavery, the legacy of those outside legal protection
from sexual harm persists, and not just for Black women.63
As will be discussed below in the specific context of adolescent workers, sexual harassment law in its current form still operates to discipline and
punish those constructed outside of legal protection. Legal construction as
reification makes it legally instinctual to distinguish and prevent some workers from seeking a legal remedy for sexual harassment not because of the
worker’s experience in the workplace, but because of the worker’s characteristics. In short, engaging in certain conduct, however unrelated to the workplace or the workplace sexual harassment a worker experiences, may divest
that worker of a right to legal relief.
B. Legitimization
Law also constructs race and gender by legitimizing racial and gender
constructions; race and gender transform from societal creations to distinct
legal categories. “Law thus defines, while seeming only to reflect, a host of
social relations, from class to gender, from race to sexual identity.”64 Those
seeking legal relief from persecution based on societal constructions are
forced to self-define using the same system of oppression.65 Through legitimization, gender and racial categories are both the mechanism for oppression and the sole opportunity for legal protection.

62.
63.

64.
65.

Revising The Contractual Concept of Consent & Ensuring An Unbiased Application of
“Reasonable Double” When The Victim Is Non-Traditional, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 41, 44–45 (2009) (stating that, although black women are more
likely to be victims of sexual assault than white women, they are less likely to be
believed in court).
Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1258–59 (2012).
See COLLINS, supra note 12, at 69–70 (controlling images of Black women “are
designed to make racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of social injustice appear
to be natural, normal, and inevitable parts of everyday life.”).
LÓPEZ, supra note 16, at 87.
See Harris, supra note 16, at 1763.
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The most prevalent example of legal construction via legitimization in
employment law is the anti-discrimination scheme established by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.66 The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, etc., in employment, education, voting and public
accommodations.67 López argues that the law’s treatment of race as a legal
category (as opposed to a socially constructed one) has guaranteed the concept of race as a permanent fixture in American society; people of color are
forced to use and conform to racial categories when seeking a legal remedy
for discrimination.68 Kimberlé Crenshaw has written that the antidiscrimination scheme in the Civil Rights Act “produc[es] apparent victories in
the short run,” yet “ultimately legitim[izes] the very racial inequality and
oppression” the Act was enacted to address.69 Courts engage in intellectual
gymnastics to construe racial categories in the most narrow manner possible, labeling narrowly-defined harms illegal and discarding the rest.70 Similarly, courts reject most attempts to push beyond the boundaries of racial
categories. And race, now legitimated, can be co-opted by Whites (who
were not subject to historical discrimination) to entrench and retrench racial
hierarchies.71
An example of legal construction as legitimization in sexual harassment doctrine is also found in the Civil Rights Act. Title VII of the Act
(“Title VII”), the section prohibiting discrimination in employment, makes
it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”72 The Civil Rights Act also created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.73 Compensatory damages, unavailable under the original act, were added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.74
Courts and scholars have readily acknowledged the race and gender
politics surrounding the addition of sex as a protected class under Title VII.
The dominant historical narrative frames the sex amendment as a last-minute “race versus gender” struggle with opponents of the Civil Rights Act
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
Id.
LÓPEZ, supra note 16, at 88.
Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1334.
See LÓPEZ, supra note 16, at 125.
See id. at 129–33.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (Westlaw
through 2015).
73. § 2000e–4(a) (Westlaw).
74. § 1981a(b) (Westlaw). See RAYMOND F. GREGORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND
THE BATTLE TO END WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION: A 50 YEAR HISTORY 75–84
(2014), for a general discussion of amendments to Title VII.
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proposing the addition of sex as a protected category in order to mock and
defeat the civil rights bill.75 The oft-repeated story is that liberal supporters
of the civil rights legislation were forced into opposing the sex amendment
to save the Act’s protections against discrimination on the basis of race.76
While some scholars have attempted to debunk the folklore surrounding the
amendment adding sex, the characterization of the addition of sex to the
Civil Rights Act as a “congressional joke” persists.77
Missing from most accounts is the critical role Black women played as
the antithetical reference to the rights of White women in passage of the
legislation. While many have argued that the eventual passage of the sex
amendment and the inclusion of sex in the Civil Rights Act ensured White
women were not excluded, a legal constructionist reading of the debate
transcripts reveals the real concern of many members of Congress was ensuring Black women were subjugated, subordinate to all men and particularly White women. From this perspective, the genesis of Title VII’s
prohibition on the discrimination on the basis of “sex” is revealed as a deliberate strategy to enshrine the social constructions of race and gender into a
legal structure that perpetuates and legitimates the position of women of
color at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy. Supporters of the
bill found themselves forced into a debate about which identity category
deserved protection—race or gender—effectively conceding the legitimacy
of those categories.
The floor debate on February 8, 1964 illustrates the legitimization
process. On that day, Congressman Howard W. Smith, a staunch civil
rights opponent, introduced an amendment to the proposed civil rights legislation adding sex as a protected class.78 Smith had previously characterized
the bill as being “as full of booby traps as a dog is full of fleas.”79 In introducing the proposed sex amendment, Smith made little effort to hide his
true intention to defeat the bill and its corollary prohibition of racial discrimination.80 Smith’s satirical performance in introducing the sex amend75. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (“This Court—like all Title VII enthusiasts—is well aware that the sex discrimination prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights
opponent Howard W. Smith.”).
76. See Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative
History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 137, 137–38, 154–55 (1997).
77. See id. at 149–50.
78. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Howard Smith).
79. Bird, supra note 76, at 151 (citing CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 116 (1985)).
80. Id. at 151–52.
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ment was successful; he had to stop speaking several times to allow for the
laughter of his colleagues to die down.81
While Smith’s introduction of the amendment may have been a ploy
designed to thwart the legislation,82 debate regarding the amendment
quickly turned to the merits. Opponents of the “sex” amendment, primarily
concerned with counteracting Smith’s efforts, argued that sex discrimination was fundamentally different than racial discrimination, and thus required separate legislation.83 The statements of some members of Congress,
however, reveal the underlying concern that omitting the category of “sex”
from the legislation would disrupt the status quo of the racial and gender
hierarchy by granting Black women more rights in the workplace than
White women.
Consider, for example, the statement of Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, a well-known segregationist, in supporting the amendment adding “sex”
as a protected basis under Title VII:
I rise in support of the amendment . . . making it possible for
the white Christian woman to receive the same consideration for
employment as the colored woman. It is incredible to me that
the authors of this monstrosity – whomever they are – would
deprive the white woman of mostly Anglo-Saxon or Christian

81. See id. (“Smith did not appear serious. . . . [a]udience members burst into laughter.
The pandemonium was so loud that Smith had to stop many times to settle everyone.”)(citations omitted).
82. See id. at 149–50 (describing efforts of the National Women’s Party (“NWP”) to
convince Smith to introduce an amendment prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sex to the Civil Rights Act). The NWP was well-known for advancing an agenda
that excluded the concerns of women of color:
The NWP was not a “typical” women’s organization. Most NWP members
came from middle or upper class backgrounds. Almost no women from the
working class joined and the party admitted no male members. Unlike
other feminist movements, which drew their strength from large membership, legacies and wealthy benefactors funded the NWP. As a result, the
NWP did not sympathize with the working class, or non-white women.
Id. at 147–48.
83. For example, Congressman Emanuel Celler, leader of the bipartisan coalition to pass
the bill, predicted adding sex as a protected category would likely defeat the entire
bill:
I think the amendment seems illogical, ill timed, ill placed and improper. . .I say, wait, indeed until more returns are in before we attempt to
do anything like this on this bill. In any event, it should not be done piecemeal, it should be done generally and universally.
110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
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heritage equal employment opportunity before the employer. I
know this Congress will not be a party to such evil.84
In opposing the addition of “sex” as a protected basis under Title VII,
Congressman Rivers deployed the construction and diametrical distinction
between the “colored woman” and the “Anglo-Saxon or Christian” White
woman to advocate for maintenance of the racial and gender hierarchy. He
described the potential disruption of the hierarchy as “evil,” appealing to the
normative ideal that race is nature and should be maintained. Rivers recognized the legitimacy granted to certain categories by the legislation. For the
structure to be legitimate, it had to enforce the usual hierarchy of subordinating people of color.
The comments of Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, known for her
work in advocating for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, are also
illuminating in this regard:
I rise in support of the amendment primarily because I feel as a
white woman when this bill has passed . . . that white women
will be last at the hiring gate.85
. . . And if you do not add sex to this bill, I really do not believe
there is a reasonable person sitting here who does not by now
understand perfectly that you are going to have white men in
one bracket, you are going to try to take colored men and
colored women and give them equal employment rights, and
down at the bottom of the list is going to be a white woman
with no rights at all.86
. . . [A] vote against this amendment today by a white man is a
vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daughter, or his
sister.87
Here, Congresswoman Griffiths appeals to the construction of “White
woman” in order to advocate for the passage of Title VII. The reference to
“wife,” “widow,” “daughter,” and “sister” is meant to remind all in attendance of the natural position of White women as higher in the gender and
race hierarchy relative to Black women. Unintentionally or intentionally,
Griffiths evokes the historical dichotomy between White and Black women
to warn of potential disruption to the social hierarchy. Griffiths’ comments
84.
85.
86.
87.

110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964) (statement of Rep. L. Mendel Rivers).
Id. at 2578.
Id. at 2579.
Id. at 2580.
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illustrate the force of legal construction via legitimization—without a category or “bracket” for White women, they would have “no rights at all.” Her
comments also illustrate that the “bracket” occupied by White men was not
to be disrupted by the legislation; there would always be a place for White
men at the top of the gender and racial hierarchy.
Of course, the passage of Title VII and the corollary provisions of the
Civil Rights Act was the result of long-standing advocacy meant to remediate historical discrimination. But the deployment of racial categorizations by
Rivers and Griffiths in debating whether to add “sex” as a protected category under the Act illustrates the embedment of social constructions into
Title VII, as well as the legal process of legitimizing racial and gender categories. Both Griffiths and Rivers were White. Griffiths was a proponent of
the legislation and supported equal employments based on race and sex.
Rivers was a staunch segregationist and opponent of the bill. Despite their
distinct political views, both Rivers and Griffiths invoked the same construction of race and racial hierarchy to accomplish their goal.
In the end, “racism serv[ed] a consensus-building hegemonic role.”88
Title VII went on to pass with a prohibition against discrimination based on
sex. With the social constructions of race and gender imported directly into
the protected bases of the statute, Title VII now legitimates and maintains
the subordinating social constructions necessitating its passage. In the fifty
years since the passage of Title VII, the statute and its judicial interpretation
has necessitated strict adherence to the protected categories in order to vindicate employment rights.89
Part III will demonstrate how, in the context of adolescent workers,
the law constructs race and gender through legitimization. The history of
Title VII reveals the embedded nature of racial and gender hierarchies in
sexual harassment doctrine. The inclusion of “sex” as a protected category
perpetuates the binary between workers who deserve legal protection, and
those that remain marginalized.

88. Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1370.
89. For example, intersectional claims alleging discrimination on a combined basis of
race and sex have been rejected as not neatly fitting into either category, despite the
reality of the intersectional plaintiff’s experience of discrimination. See Crenshaw,
supra note 10, at 1473, for a discussion of the difficulty in conceptualizing intersectional claims. Further, courts have struggled with how to define discrimination based
on “sex.” See generally, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (establishing that gender stereotyping is actionable under Title VII as discrimination
“based on sex”).
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C. Transcendence
Another way the law constructs race and gender is through transcendence. Professor Ian Haney López theorizes that the use of case precedent
and legal language provides new and obscured pathways for racial and gender subordination to transcend its historical roots in ways that appear neutral, natural, and non-subordinating.90 Historical constructions of race and
gender are revitalized and embedded in deceptively innocuous and neutral
legal tests, terms, phrases, and doctrine.91
For example, López examines the deployment of the phrase “alien ineligible for citizenship” as a synonym for “Japanese” to avoid the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 Between 1913 and 1947,
eleven states prohibited an “alien ineligible to citizenship” from owning agricultural land.93 In his concurrence in Oyama v. California, the 1948 Supreme Court case striking down a California statute forbidding land
ownership by Japanese “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” Justice William
Murphy characterized the California statute in question as “nothing more
than an outright racial discrimination.”94 Rejecting California’s argument
that the law’s use of the phrase “alien ineligible to citizenship” lacked a
racist purpose or intent, Justice Murphy examined the social and historical
genesis of the California law’s 1913 enactment and wrote that despite the
“cloak”95 provided by the “alien ineligible for citizenship” phrase, “[t]he intention of those responsible for the 1913 law was plain. The ‘Japanese menace’ was to be dealt with on a racial basis.”96
In this modern era of post-racial, post-identity, universalist, and colorblind politics, it is critical to identify and address the law’s role in constructing race and gender through transcendence. The cyclical interplay between
law, race, and gender is an increasingly invisible and particularly destructive
force. Through law, racial and gender subordination transcend and transform from socially unsavory beliefs into deceptively innocuous legal doctrine.97 The effect of the racial and gender subordination is the same, but
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

LÓPEZ, supra note 16, at 90.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90-92.
Id. at 90 (citing Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California
and Ten Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7 (1947)).
Oyama, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring).
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 655.
LÓPEZ, supra note 16, at 91 (“Legal language can allow ideas of race to transcend
their historical context through precedent, and also can contribute to the construction of race by providing a new vocabulary with which to take note of, stigmatize,
and penalize putative racial differences . . . Law thus frees racial categories not only
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the process is freed from societal disapproval and legal prohibition. Thus,
the modern challenge is less about remembering racism and sexism and
more about seeing what the law has obscured.
A salient example of the transcendent power of the law to construct
race and gender in sexual harassment doctrine is evident in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, the landmark Supreme Court decision first recognizing a
Title VII claim based on hostile work environment sexual harassment.98
Mechelle Vinson, a bank teller in Washington, D.C. at a predecessor bank
of Meritor Savings Bank, brought a sexual harassment action against the
bank and Sidney Taylor, the branch manager. Pervasive through the court
record, yet absent from the Supreme Court’s opinion, was the fact that both
Vinson and Taylor were Black.
Vinson alleged Taylor sexually harassed and assaulted her throughout
her tenure at the bank from September 1974 until her termination for absenteeism in November 1978.99 Vinson testified during the eleven-day
bench trial before the District Court that Taylor hired her as a teller
trainee.100 Vinson described Taylor as “fatherly” during her 90-day probationary period, after which she was promoted from teller, to head teller, and
eventually assistant branch manager.101 In May 1975, Taylor took Vinson
out to dinner and propositioned her.102 When she refused, Taylor reminded
Vinson that he hired her and that she “owed him.”103 She eventually agreed
to have sex with Taylor out of fear that she would lose her job at the
bank.104 Vinson testified she was forced to have sex with Taylor forty to fifty
times between May 1975 and 1977, mostly at the bank, both during and
after bank hours.105 All of the encounters were against her will, and Taylor
forcibly raped her on several occasions.106 Her vaginal bleeding was so bad
after one rape that she had to seek medical attention.107 In addition to the
sexual assault, Vinson endured Taylor’s touching and fondling (sometimes
in front of other bank employees), him exposing himself to her, and his

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

from contextual bounds, but also from the bounds society places on the use of
race . . . the law’s ability to provide seemingly neutral synonyms for race may be one
of the most important legal mechanisms in the current processes of racial
construction.”).
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59–60 (1986).
Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *1.
Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *1.
Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
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inappropriate sexual remarks.108 Vinson also testified that she never reported
Taylor’s actions because he threatened to have her raped (as another bank
employee had recently been raped) and had threatened her life.109
Sidney Taylor denied all of Vinson’s allegations, testifying that he
never fondled or touched Vinson, made suggestive remarks, had a sexual
relationship with her, or even asked Vinson for sex.110 He maintained that
he only went to lunch with Vinson once with another employee.111 Finally,
he accused Vinson of making sexual advances towards him, which he declined.112 The bank argued it was not liable for sexual harassment since
Vinson never complained about Taylor’s conduct or reported her
allegations.113
After the bench trial, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia found for Taylor and the bank, finding that Vinson was not
the victim of sexual harassment.114 Specifically, the court found Vinson’s
promotions and raises were based on merit alone and not as a condition of a
sexual relationship with Taylor. The court found that Vinson was never
required to endure the sexual assaults and harassment in order to maintain
employment or be promoted at the bank, and, if there was a relationship
with Taylor (a fact that Taylor denied throughout trial), then it was
“voluntary.”115
Vinson appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reversed.116 First, the court found the district erred in holding Vinson was not the victim of sexual harassment, as her allegations may have
demonstrated a harassing work environment even if she did not experience a
loss of tangible job benefits. Second, the court questioned the district
court’s finding that any relationship between Taylor and Vinson was “voluntary.”117 Importantly, the court noted that the district court’s finding of
Vinson’s voluntary participation in a sexual relationship with Taylor may
have been based upon “the voluminous testimony regarding Vinson’s dress
and personal fantasies,” and also that “a woman does not waive her Title
VII rights by her sartorial or whimsical proclivities.”118
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Vinson,
Vinson,
Vinson,
Vinson,
Vinson,
Vinson,
Vinson,
Vinson,
Vinson
Vinson,
Vinson,

23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *2.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *3.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *7–8.
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, at *7–8.
v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
753 F.2d at 145.
753 F.2d at 146, n.36.
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals decision.119 Endorsing the EEOC regulations at
the time, the Supreme Court recognized two ways to state a claim under
Title VII: (1) quid pro quo harassment, and (2) harassment based upon a
sexually hostile work environment.120 The majority opinion, authored by
Judge Rehnquist, held Title VII is violated when the sexual harassment is
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”121
On the issue of “voluntariness,” the Supreme Court agreed with the
D.C. Circuit that “welcomeness” was the correct standard to evaluate hostile work environment sexual harassment.122 The court held the district
court’s focus on whether Taylor’s sexual advances were voluntary, “in the
sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will,”
was misplaced.123 The correct inquiry is “welcomeness” which “presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credibility determinations.”124
In evaluating that proof, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Circuit
Court’s rejection of evidence concerning Vinson’s style of dress and sexual
fantasies.125 Relying upon the emphasis of the EEOC guidelines requiring
the trier of fact to evaluate allegations of sexual harassment “in light of the
record as a whole” and “the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of
the sexual advances and context in which the alleged incidents occurred,”
the Supreme Court found evidence of a plaintiff’s “sexually provocative
speech or dress” to be “obviously relevant.”126
Patricia Barry, Vinson’s attorney, offered key insight about the evidence offered at trial about Vinson:
What happened in [the] courtroom was not a rational, orderly
attempt to get at the truth of what happened to Mechelle Vinson, but rather a ritualistic pyschodrama based on enduring, but
extremely hostile and even possibly subconscious, notions of
who a woman is. At trial, we had a throwback, a lapse, to old
defenses against a woman’s charge of sexual abuse by a man. The
defenses are she deserved it because she asked for it; we know she
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Meritor Sav.
Meritor, 477
Meritor, 477
Meritor, 477
Meritor, 477
Meritor, 477
Meritor, 477
Meritor, 477

Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
U.S. at 64–65.
U.S. at 67.
U.S. at 68.
U.S. at 68.
U.S. at 68.
U.S. at 68–69.
U.S. at 69.
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asked for it, because she is a temptress, a seductress, a lascivious
woman.127
Interestingly, despite the clear assessment throughout the Circuit
Court and Supreme Court opinion that the legal and factual findings of the
district court were improper, the Supreme Court offered no evaluation or
guidance on how lower courts should evaluate the relevance of a plaintiff’s
“sexually provocative speech or dress,” and instead implicitly endorsed an
inexplicably broad universe of potential evidence. Tellingly, none of the evidence about Vinson’s speech, fantasies, or dress directly involved Sidney
Taylor.128 Throughout the trial, Taylor denied having any relationship with
Vinson. Other than testifying that he rebuffed a sexual advance from Vinson, neither Taylor nor the bank appear to have argued that Vinson’s speech
or dress “welcomed” Taylor’s conduct. In short, the trial testimony about
Vinson’s sexuality and style of dress offered no “context” whatsoever to her
allegations of Sidney Taylor’s repeated harassment.
In her recent examination of plaintiff Mechelle Vinson’s experience
litigating her sexual harassment claim in Meritor Savings, Professor Tanya
Hernandez identifies the court’s importation of socio-historical racial and
gender constructions into jurisprudence affecting all women litigating sexual harassment suits:
(T)he Supreme Court’s decision to make a complainant’s “sexually provocative speech or dress” relevant to a finding of sexual
harassment embeds unconscious historical presumptions about
the wantonness of Black women into the legal doctrine. The examination of the attire of Black women (such as Mechelle Vinson) dovetails with stereotypic notions of the sexual availability
of Black women. By ignoring the race of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court was able to overlook the significance of racial stereotypes that pervade the question of appropriate evidence of
welcomeness. The insistence on a color-blind assessment in the
Supreme Court analysis obstructed recognition of the speech
and dress portion of the welcomeness assessment as a problematic racial construct. As a result, all sexual harassment plaintiffs
are now unfairly burdened with an inquiry into whether their

127. Tanya K. Hernández, “What Not to Wear”-Race and Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: The Story of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in WOMEN AND THE LAW
STORIES 301 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011).
128. Id. at 285, 286 n.49.
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apparel and speech welcomed sexual advances, and this evidence
may be used to eviscerate their claims of sexual harassment.129
The legacy of Meritor’s endorsement of whether an evaluation of a
plaintiff is “promiscuous,” is an incredibly difficult hurdle for sexual harassment plaintiffs to clear. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence try to limit
the use of character evidence (and specifically evidence concerning a plaintiff’s sexual history) at trial, the evidence is vulnerable to discovery.130 The
Supreme Court’s 1998 decisions in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton established an affirmative defense to liability
often used by employers in hostile work environment cases;131 transcendence operates in the analysis of the Ellerth/Faragher defense to cloak constructions of race and gender into the “reasonable” actions of the employee
in reporting the alleged harassment.132 Phrases like “alien ineligible for citizenship,” “sexually provocative speech or dress” and even “reasonable” work
in similar ways to stabilize racial and gender hierarchies. Legal construction
through transcendence has guaranteed that the constructions of race and
gender remain a permanent fixture in sexual harassment doctrine.
129. Hernández, supra note 127, at 303–04.
130. FED. R. EVID. 412.
131. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
132. The affirmative defense is a two-prong test that aims to assess whether: (a) the plaintiff “reasonably” responded and worked to halt the harassing behavior, and (b)
whether the employer had appropriate mechanisms in place to prevent harassment
and quickly correct harassing behavior. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 765. Scholars have noted the unreasonable nature of the affirmative defense and
its mismatch with social science data on how victims of sexual harassment actually
respond to harassing behavior. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman,
The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008).
Other scholars have criticized the defense for allowing employers the benefit of an
affirmative defense for having mechanisms in place like anti-sexual harassment training which may do little to actually prevent harassment. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp,
Fixing Watches With Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Sexual Harassment
Training By The Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 162–63
(2001) (“Given the prevalence of sexual harassment training, one might assume that
its utility is beyond dispute. Yet very little empirical research has been conducted on
the effects of these programs.”). Prof. Hernández has argued that women of color
specifically are more limited by the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense because they
are less likely to report harassment internally (for various reasons), which may
prejudice their ability to bring a harassment claim. Hernández, supra note 10, at
1269. I argue, as illustrated through discussion of the adolescent hostile work environment case of Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Part III.C.1. infra, that the Ellerth/
Faragher defense is a demonstration of the legal construction of race and gender
through transcendence.
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ADOLESCENT WORKERS

This section begins by reviewing the empirical evidence of the age
disparity in sexual harassment victims. Research shows that adolescent
workers experience a higher level of harassment than their adult counterparts despite a shorter tenure in the workplace.133 Adolescent workers also
experience more severe workplace harassment.134 This section briefly examines some of the federal and state intervention strategies. The section concludes by examining some of the deleterious effects workplace sexual
harassment can have on adolescent workers and arguing that special legal
protection for adolescent workers can help mitigate some of these harmful
repercussions.
A. The Empirical Data
American teenagers today are active participants in the labor market.
Data from the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) for July 2014 (historically the highest month for adolescent
employment)135 indicates that 20.1 million 16-24 year-olds were employed,
which translates to a labor force participation rate of 51.9%.136 Almost 2.6
million young workers during the same month were ages 16–17.137 The
number of adolescent workers has been higher in the past and is increasing
again.138 Other estimates suggest higher levels of adolescent employment;
75% of respondents to the National Youth Longitudinal Survey 1997 reported working at some point during their senior year of high school.139
The actual prevalence of adolescents working is likely higher; the National
133. Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 555.
134. Id. at 553–55.
135. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Youth Employment and Unemployment, July 2014, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140819.htm (last visited
Sept. 1, 2014).
136. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employment and
Unemployment Among Youth - Summer 2014 (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/youth_08132014.htm [hereinafter, News Release, Youth Employment Summer 2014].
137. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BLS.GOV, http://beta.bls.gov/dataViewer/view/timeseries/
LNU01000086 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
138. See News Release, Youth Employment Summer 2014, supra note 136 (describing a
peak in the summer labor force participation rate in July 1989, a decline through the
1990s, and a current upward trend).
139. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Work Activity of
High School Students: Data From The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997, http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy97r6.pdf.
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Youth Longitudinal Survey does not measure informal “freelance” employment such as housekeeping, babysitting, and gardening.140
Adolescent workers may be more vulnerable to sexual harassment because of the types of jobs young workers tend to hold. Of the 20.1 million
youth employed, 25% worked in hospitality (including food services) and
19% worked in retail.141 Generally, teenagers are more likely to be employed in these two industries.142 Researchers have found that both tolerable
(consensual flirting) and intolerable (sexual harassment) forms of sexual behaviors are more prevalent in hospitality and retail industries.143 Teen workers may also be perceived as easy targets for sexual harassment; workers that
are young, unmarried, and have low seniority status tend to experience
higher rates of sexual harassment.144
Only recently, however, have social scientists examined the prevalence
of sexual harassment of adolescent workers.145 In 2002, Professor Susan
Fineran, a professor of social work and gender studies at the University of
Southern Maine, published a study finding 35% of working adolescents
surveyed experienced some form of sexual harassment at work.146 Of the
working teenagers reporting sexual harassment, 63% were female and 37%
were male.147 In a follow-up study published in 2009 focused solely on
adolescent women, Fineran along with sociology Professor James Gruber
found that 52% of working adolescent women reported being the target of
sexually harassing behavior in the preceding 12 months.148 In a separate
study of college students recalling adolescent work experiences published in
140. Id.
141. News Release, Youth Employment Summer 2014, supra note 136.
142. Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, Sexual Harassment as a Gendered Expression
of Power, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 64, 68 (2004).
143. Id.
144. Id.; Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 551–52.
145. See id., at 551 (discussing how the limited empirical data available on adolescent
workers and sexual harassment makes it “apparent that research has not kept pace
with rising legal and social concerns over this issue.”); see also Karen L. Sears et al.,
Sexual Harassment and Psychosocial Maturity Outcomes Among Young Adults Recalling
Their First Adolescent Work Experiences, 64 SEX ROLES: J. RES. 491, 492 (2011) (discussing how, despite scholarship on work stressors for adolescent workers, there is an
absence of literature on the sexual harassment of teens in their early work
experiences).
146. Fineran, supra note 5, at 960.
147. Id. Fineran’s 2002 study sampled 712 high school students, 393 of whom worked.
Of those 393 working students, 137 or about 35%, reported experiencing some type
of sexually harassing behavior. Id. at 958, 960.
148. Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 554. The researchers analyzed responses from
260 female high school students at a private high school for girls in New England.
The overall response rate was high at 90% of enrolled students, and represented all
grade levels. Fifty-eight percent of the students reported working outside school, all
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2011, psychologists Karen Sears, Robert Intrieri, and Dennis Papini found
61% of young women and 46% of young men reported experiencing sexually harassing behavior.149
When compared with adult workers working full-time, the prevalence
of sexual harassment reported by adolescent workers is alarmingly high, especially when considering that most adolescent workers have a much shorter
tenure in the workplace and work part-time.150 It is difficult to compare the
prevalence of sexual harassment involving teen workers to adult workers due
to differences between survey timeframes, questionnaire design, and variations in how respondents characterize and label sexually harassing behaviors.151 However, the general trend in social science data is that adult
part-time. Of those working, 44% worked in food service and 36% in retail sales. Id.
at 552, 554.
149. Sears et al., supra note 145, at 500. The researchers surveyed 586 introductory psychology students at a Midwestern university, 316 women and 270 men. The study
had a 43% response rate, and participants were ages 18–24. The majority of participants (73%) were freshman. Id. at 495–96.
150. As the focus of this work is the legal construction of sexual harassment doctrine
involving adolescent workers, racial disparities in the work experience of teen workers versus adult workers is beyond the Article’s scope. It is striking, though not surprising, that little data exists examining adolescent workers of color and workplace
sexual harassment. For example, the respondents in Fineran & Gruber’s research of
working adolescents and workplace sexual harassment were overwhelmingly white;
non-white female students were 4% of the student population and 5% of the sample. Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 552. In the study published in 2011 by Sears
et al., 15% of participants were non-white. Sears et al., supra note 145, at 496. No
large study has yet examined the experience of young women of color with workplace sexual harassment. Research does support that adult women of color may experience workplace sexual harassment more often than their White peers. In 2005,
Hernández published a law review article discussing her empirical work in analyzing
EEOC complaints alleging sexual harassment. See Hernández, supra note 10. Hernández summarized empirical research to explore whether women of color may be
disproportionately targeted as victims of sexual harassment. Id. at 110. Hernández
found a racial disparity in the EEOC charge data, and theorized that women of color
are more likely to file formal charges with an outside agency than use internal complaint procedures due to concerns like fear of retaliation lack of confidentiality. Id. at
105, 128.
Research does support that adult women of color may experience workplace
sexual harassment more often than their White peers. In 2005, Hernandez published
a law review article discussing her empirical work in analyzing EEOC complaints
alleging sexual harassment. Hernández, supra note 10. She explored whether women
of color may be disproportionately targeted as victims of sexual harassment. Id. at
110 (summarizing empirical research). She found a racial disparity in the EEOC
charge data, and theorized that women of color are more likely to file formal charges
with an outside agency than use internal complaint procedures due to concerns like
fear of retaliation lack of confidentiality. Id. at 105, 128.
151. See Beiner, supra note 9, at 10 (discussing difficulties in interpreting social science
data on sexual harassment for legal purposes); Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at
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workers report the same or less sexual harassment over a much-longer tenure
in the workplace. In the landmark survey of federal employees by the
United States Merit Systems Protection Board, 44% of women and 19% of
men reported experiencing harassing behaviors in the preceding two
years.152 Fineran and Gruber compared their results to similar studies involving adult workers and concluded that “when compared to research on
adult women, teenage girls not only experienced more harassment but also
[that it] occurred in a shorter time period.”153
Teenagers in the workplace are also experiencing more severe harassment when compared to adult workers. The adolescent women in Fineran
& Gruber’s study reported a 47% prevalence of gender harassment (e.g.
inappropriate sexual remarks or jokes), a 38% prevalence of unwanted sexual attention (e.g. offensive touching, requests for sex), and a 5% prevalence
of sexual coercion (sexual bribery and assault), the most egregious form of
sexual harassment.154 Fineran and Gruber concluded that adolescent women
may experience gender harassment and unwanted attention more frequently
than adult workers.155 While the researchers could not calculate a statistical
analysis on the prevalence of sexual coercion of adolescent girls, they found

152.
153.

154.

155.

551 (noting variations among number of workers reporting sexual harassment in
different studies). Fineran & Gruber suggest that increased use of the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (“SEQ”) is improving social scientists’ ability to compare data
across studies. The researchers note that the SEQ “has been used in a number of
occupational and educational contexts” and “used extensively cross-culturally. From
their perspective, the SEQ is considered highly reliable. Id. at 551, 553.
U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 13 (1995).
Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 555. The researchers noted two studies in which
adult workers reported a higher incidence of harassment, up to sixty-seven percent;
however, the study sought experiences over a 24-month time period, rather than a
12-month time period, and most of the workers were employed full-time, rather
than part-time. Id. at 554–55 (citing K. Schneider et. al, Job Related and Psychological
Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401–15 (1997)).
Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 553, 555. Fineran’s 2002 study also found adolescent workers to be experiencing severe types of harassment: 67% reported being
told sexually offensive jokes, 18% were shown sexually offensive pictures or
messages, 43% were “grabbed” sexually, 36% were “pressured” for a date, 7% experienced sexual pressure, and 2% experienced rape or attempted rape. The prevalence
of attempted rape or rape between the young women and women was equal. While
slightly more of the young men reported being shown sexually offensive pictures and
messages, touched sexually, and pressured for a date, the young women in the study
were more likely to be called sexually offensive names, experience negative comments
about their body or clothing, hear sexually offensive jokes, and experience unwanted
sexual pressure. Fineran, supra note 5, at 961.
Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 555 (contrasting data with a 1999 study of
maintenance workers, clerical staff, and employed college students who reported
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it “disturbing” that the girls in the study (who all worked part-time) reported sexual coercion at rates comparable to earlier studies on adult women
working full-time.156
Another theme in the social science is the broad age disparity between
perpetrator and victim. In Fineran & Gruber’s 2009 study of adolescent
girls, 46% described the perpetrator as over 30.157 When asked about the
employment status of the harassers in Fineran’s 2002 study, 19% named a
supervisor, 61% identified a co-worker, and 18% reported unidentified
others.158 The results for the girls in Fineran and Gruber’s 2009 study were
similar: when asked about the “most upsetting” harassment experience,
56% of the perpetrators were co-workers, with the remaining perpetrators
being a supervisor or other.159
B. Current Intervention Strategies
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is the
federal agency charged with investigating workplace sexual harassment
charges under Title VII, including those brought by adolescent workers. In
2004, in response to the growing number of Title VII charges lodged by
adolescent workers, the EEOC launched the Youth@Work initiative. The
initiative is a broad educational and outreach campaign designed to address
issues of discrimination against teenage employees and to increase awareness
of their employment rights and responsibilities, including sexual harassment.160 Youth@Work has three components: (1) educational outreach
events, (2) partnerships with businesses and advocacy organizations, and (3)
a website.161 The Youth@Work website contains a video designed to educate
adolescent workers about the workplace environment, educational materials
available for download aimed at both teen workers and adult workshop
facilitators, descriptions of example enforcement actions brought by the
EEOC on behalf of adolescent workers, and information about filing an
EEOC charge.162 Similarly, state employment agencies and advocacy orga-

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

gender harassment at a rate of 29%, 27%, and 29%, respectively, and unwanted
sexual attention at a rate of 15%, 14%, and 10%, respectively).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 554.
Fineran, supra note 5, at 961.
Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 554.
EEOC Youth@Work Press Release, supra note 7.
Id.
EEOC Youth@Work homepage, supra note 7.
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nizations are beginning to develop educational efforts aimed at protecting
teen workers from sexual harassment.163
In addition to the Youth@Work initiative, the EEOC brings enforcement suits on behalf of adolescent workers.164 Between 2001 and 2004, the
number of EEOC sexual harassment charges brought by adolescent workers
quadrupled from 2% to 8% of total EEOC harassment charges.165 Of the
165 cases the EEOC filed between September 30, 1999 and September 30,
2008 involving adolescent workers, 135 (almost 82%) involved a sexual harassment claim.166
Despite the social science data indicating that the sexual harassment of
adolescent workers is an increasing problem, not enough is known about
sexual harassment cases brought by teenagers. The EEOC does not track the
ages of employees filing charges of harassment. It is therefore difficult, if not
impossible, to know how many of these cases are actually litigated, given the
lack of an agency or entity tracking sexual harassment litigation by age.167
C. The Need For Adolescent-Specific Doctrine
One of the most developed arguments for aggressively protecting adolescent workers comes from the brain science research on adolescent development. Jennifer Drobac argues that teen workers are especially vulnerable
to sexual abuse in the workplace due to an under-developed ability to make
decisions.168 This under-development affects the ability of adolescent workers to appropriately engage in appropriate workplace conduct, recognize inappropriate behaviors, and respond to workplace harassment.169
163. E.g., Youth@Work: Talking Safety, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/departments/dph/programs/admin/dmoa/ohsp/injuries-workers-under-18/educationalmaterials/youth-work-talking-safety.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
164. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Everdry Waterproofing To Pay $585,000 For Teen Harassment; Jury Returns Verdict in EEOC Sex
Bias Suit (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-2706.cfm (discussing jury verdict in EEOC v. Everdry Mktg. & Mgmt.).
165. Cathleen Flahardy, EEOC Responds To Sexual Harassment Complaints From Teens,
INSIDE COUNSEL (Nov. 1, 2005), available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2005/
11/01/eeoc-responds-to-sexual-harassment-complaints-from.
166. See, EEOC Teen Litigation Report, SCHUSTER INSTITUTE FOR INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM, BRANDEIS UNIV., https://www.brandeis.edu/investigate/teenSH1/
EEOCyouthatwork.html (follow “EEOC Teen Litigation Report” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 26, 2014).
167. See Gunderson, Deepest Scars, supra note 6 (criticizing the EEOC and Oregon BOLI
for failing to track sexual harassment charges by age).
168. Drobac, Developing Capacity, supra note 8, at 11–32 (discussing neurological, developmental, and psychosocial research).
169. Id.
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A second reason to scrutinize protection for adolescent workers is due
to their relative lack of experience in the workplace. Adolescent workers
need to be socialized into the workplace, and pervasive sexual harassment
can result in negative socialization. Researchers have found that adolescent
workers are more likely to engage in “greater jostling, flirting and teasing,”170 and need assistance learning the “meaning and acceptability” of
workplace relationships and interactions.171 Despite a familiarity with sexual
harassment as an abstract concept, adolescents are “less experienced in distinguishing between acceptable and problematic workplace conduct.”172
For example, one worker witnessing sexually inappropriate jokes and comments at the diner where she worked as a teenager initially found it humorous.173 It was only upon describing the incident to friends and family that
the young woman understood the conduct to be improper.174 Reflecting
upon the manager’s comment as an adult, the same worker found the conduct offensive.175 This young woman had a supportive network that helped
her distinguish between proper and improper work behavior. Many adolescent workers are not as lucky.176
Another adult worker describing her adolescent employment recounted how, because of her youth, she simply did not know how to react
when assaulted by a much older coworker:

170. Uggen & Blackstone, supra note 142, at 68 (citing ESTER REITER, MAKING FAST
FOOD: FROM THE FRYING PAN INTO THE FRYER (1991)).
171. Id. (citing JEYLAN MORTIMER, WORKING AND GROWING UP IN AMERICA (2003));
see also Laurence Steinberg et al., Early Work Experience: A Partial Antidote for Adolescent Egocentrism, 10 J. YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE 141, 143–44 (1981).
172. Uggen & Blackstone, supra note 142, at 60 (citing Vicky Schultz, The Sanitized
Workplace, 112 YALE L. J. 2061 (2003)).
173. See Amy Blackstone et al., Legal Consciousness and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 43
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 655 (2009).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Often, older workers discourage young workers from recognizing and reporting harassment. Another adolescent restaurant worker was convinced by an older female
worker to ignore harassment by a customer:
That was really the first time I experienced that blatant sexual propositioning. I was pretty innocent and a naı̈ve Catholic girl, so I really felt unsafe
for a while after that.
I told [an adult] waitress. She was a lot older. . . . She basically just said that
it was a pattern [this customer] had, that when he came in he would talk to
other waitresses that way. She was kind of nonchalant. She had worked
there for probably 15 years. I think it was just part of daily life for her in a
sense.
Id. at 656.
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He asked me to go in the freezer and get him something. So I
went in there and grabbed it and when I turned around with the
box he was there and he tried to kiss me. And I was like, ‘Whoa!
You can’t kiss me! I don’t like you! I’m only 14!’ I told him, I
said, ‘No!’177
When asked during the interview how she would react as an adult in
the same situation, the same worker believed she would possess the maturity
to label her co-worker’s conduct as inappropriate and act more forcefully.178
Indeed, psychologists Karen Sears, Robert Intrieri, and Dennis Papini concluded that adolescent workers have lower rates of recognizing and responding to workplace sexual harassment when compared to adult workers.179
A third reason to protect adolescent workers from sexual harassment is
that adolescent victims of workplace sexual harassment may experience
long-term detrimental mental health effects. Social scientists have long emphasized the importance of healthy early work environments for adolescent
workers.180 And it is well documented that workplace sexual harassment
generally has a detrimental effect on a worker’s mental health.181 Interestingly, the studies involving adolescent workers and sexual harassment have
shown limited short-term effects on the teenager’s mental health.182 However, new research shows that the experience of early-career sexual harassment is a stressor that increases the likelihood of depression symptoms later
in adulthood for both male and female workers.183 Adolescent men who
resist and report workplace harassment have been found to experience negatively impacted psychosocial development.184 Women in the same study
were more likely to report being upset by an incident of sexual harass177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Uggen & Blackstone, supra note 142, at 86.
Id.
Sears et al., supra note 145, at 501.
See id. at 491-92.
See Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 552.
Id. at 557. The researchers hypothesized that the lack of immediate mental health
impact may be due to the small sample size in the most serious forms of harassment,
as well as other factors such as academic support and involvement and economic
advantage. Id. at 558. Sears, Intrieri & Papini similarly found exposure to sexual
behavior at work to not necessarily be an upsetting experience among adolescents in
the United States. Sears et al., supra note 145, at 501.
183. Jason N. Houle et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on Depressive Symptoms during the Early Occupational Career, 1 SOC’Y & MENTAL HEALTH 89, 97 (2011). The
study found a positive correlation between early-career harassment and increased depressive symptoms even after controlling for past depression, other harassment experiences, and other workplace stressors. Id.
184. Sears et al., supra note 145, at 499.
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ment.185 Other studies have shown early work experiences can impact personality development.186
Fourth, although adolescent workers may not report immediate
mental health problems, workplace sexual harassment may detrimentally affect the teenager’s academic environment and performance. The harassed
girls in Fineran and Gruber’s study had statistically significantly higher
levels of school avoidance and academic withdrawal.187 The researchers theorized that the effects of workplace sexual harassment may be a detriment to
academic performance and negatively impact an adolescent’s future.188
Fifth, research also shows that many victims of harassment are more
likely to be harassed later in life. In a study published in 2004 by sociologists Christopher Uggen and Amy Blackstone, the researchers discovered a
striking correlation between workers’ harassment as adolescents and later
harassment as adults.189 Uggen and Blackstone looked at the prevalence of
the “syndrome of behavioral sexual harassment,” which they defined as
“harassing behaviors” that are “severe or pervasive and concurrent in time
and place,” thus approximating the legal test for actionable sexual harassment.190 Seventy-two percent of the survey respondents experiencing the
behavioral syndrome in adolescence experienced it as adults.191 For adolescents generally (both male and female), adolescent workers who experience
sexual harassment are ten times more likely than their non-harassed counterparts to experience harassment as adults.192 The risk is especially great for
male adolescent workers, who are twenty times more likely to experience
harassment as adults if they experienced workplace sexual harassment as an
adolescent worker.193
Sixth, experiencing workplace sexual harassment may negatively impact an adolescent worker’s future employment opportunities. Fineran and
Gruber found that girls experiencing workplace sexual harassment reported
more stress from work, lower satisfaction with both their coworkers and
supervisors, and were more likely to consider leaving their job.194 Fineran
theorized that an early experience with sexual harassment may put girls at
risk for normalizing future sexually harassing behavior, inhibit the develop185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 500.
Id. at 491–92.
Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 555.
Id. at 557.
Uggen & Blackstone, supra note 142, at 76.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Fineran & Gruber, supra note 5, at 555.
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ment of future career goals, and lower expectations about income.195 One
young victim of sexual harassment demonstrates the risk for adolescent
women: After being groped by her supervisor at a fast-food restaurant and
struggling to find assistance in remedying the problem, she was “totally disgusted” and quit despite needing the job to support two children and finish
high school.196
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE & ADOLESCENT WORKERS
A. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy: Genesis of Adolescent-Specific Doctrine
The development of adolescent-specific sexual harassment jurisprudence under Title VII began with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Doe v.
Oberweis Dairy (7th Cir. 2006). Oberweis Dairy involved the sexual harassment claim of a sixteen-year-old ice cream scooper at an ice cream parlor in
Bartlett, Illinois. Matt Nayman, a twenty-five-year-old shift supervisor had a
penchant for the teenaged women working at the store.197 He was known to
“grope, kiss, grab butts, hug and give tittie twisters,” to these women, and
invite the women to his apartment.198 He had engaged in sexual intercourse
with another adolescent employee at his apartment before he did so with
Doe.199 There was some level of factual dispute as to the level Doe may
have “welcomed” Nayman’s advances, but no dispute that Nayman committed “statutory rape” not “forcible rape,” and that Doe was “an active
participant in, rather than a passive victim of . . . the act of sexual intercourse with Nayman.”200 The district court granted the employer’s motion
for summary judgment, finding Nayman’s advances were not unwelcome
and that the work-related contact was not severe or pervasive.201
Judge Richard Posner authored the opinion for the panel on appeal.202
Despite evidence that the sexual relationship between Doe and Nayman was
consensual, the Oberweis Dairy court declined to apply the prima facie case
for hostile work environment claims under Meritor, fashioning instead a
special rule for hostile work environment claims under Title VII brought by
195. Id. at 557.
196. Heather McLaughlin et al., Social Class and Workplace Harassment During the Transition to Adulthood, in 199 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 85, 87 (J.T. Morimer ed., 2008).
197. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2006).
198. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713.
199. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713.
200. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 715.
201. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, No. 03-C-4774, 2005 WL 782709, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
6, 2005).
202. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 707.
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adolescent workers.203 The Seventh Circuit found that a minor employee,
one who is under the state jurisdiction’s age of consent, could not “welcome” sexual advances.204 Thus, if the other elements were satisfied (severity, pervasiveness, subjectively and objectively offensive), and the claim was
brought by a minor employee, the prima facie case for hostile work environment harassment is met and the employer is liable for harassment, even if
the adolescent worker arguably consented to or “welcomed” the conduct.
The Oberweis Dairy standard therefore appears to significantly lower the bar
for adolescent workers bringing hostile work environment claims. If the harassment otherwise met the prima facie case for harassment under Title VII
(which sexual intercourse often does), a minor worker could easily state a
claim even if they arguably “consented” to the interaction or “welcomed”
the harassers advances.
Judge Posner cited three reasons for the need for a bright-line test
when analyzing sexual harassment claims by teen workers. First, fixing the
“welcomeness” standard to the age of majority in a particular state defers to
state policy and avoids making what a state legislature designates as a nonconsensual act in the criminal context (sexual intercourse while a minor) a
consensual one in a civil lawsuit. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the opinion emphasized that consent to conduct criminalized to protect a
class of litigants cannot then operate to bar a tort action premised upon the
same conduct.205 The court reasoned that the inconsistency of state standards governing the age of majority in various contexts was outweighed by
the deference agenda.206 Second, the court cited simplification of employment discrimination jurisprudence. Third, and apparently most important
to Judge Posner, the Oberweis Dairy court sought to avoid the “arbitrary”
process of inquiring into the “maturity” of each adolescent worker and the
ability of that worker to welcome sexual advances.207
Just when it seemed the Seventh Circuit was to take a promising step
away from the embedded race/gender construction, Judge Posner acted to
quickly revitalize it:
At the damages stage of this proceeding, should it get that far,
the defendant. . .should be permitted to put Nayman’s conduct
in perspective. If Doe was sneaking around behind her mother’s
– and her employer’s – back and thus facilitating Nayman’s be203. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713–14.
204. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713–14.
205. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 713 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 892C (1979)).
206. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 714.
207. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 714.
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havior, the employer may be able to show that the harm she
suffered that was caused by its violation of Title VII (if such a
violation is found on remand), rather than by Nayman, was
minimal. . .
Though inquiries into the maturity of individual minors are, as
we said earlier, bound to be fraught with uncertainty, a jury
should be able to sort out the difference between an employer’s
causal contribution to the statutory rape by its employee of a sixteen-year-old siren (if that turns out to be an accurate description
of Doe) and to similar conduct toward, say, a twelve-year-old.208
Here, Judge Posner makes an astonishing leap in logic. There is a huge
difference between placing the behavior of a supervisor “in context” by examining whether a plaintiff contributed to her own harm (here, by sneaking
around behind her mother’s back) and “facilitating” behavior, and determining whether the plaintiff was a whore who deserved what she got. Notably, Oberweis Dairy defended the action by claiming Doe was lying (other
employees contradicted her factual allegations), that the two were “friends,”
and that the sexual encounter happened at Nayman’s home with no impact
on the workplace. Oberweis Dairy did not argue that Doe was promiscuous
or a seductress.
Instead of focusing on the conduct and context at issue, the Seventh
Circuit re-imports a judgment of a plaintiff’s character. Stated differently, if
there is evidence that the teen worker was promiscuous, seduced her attacker, was not a virgin, dressed provocatively, spoke provocatively, or otherwise signaled she was sexually available, she could be barred from any
monetary remedy. If the adolescent plaintiff is a “siren,” she should be held
responsible for causing her own damages.209 Posner uses the construction of
unworthy woman as “siren”210 to justify withholding legal protection for
sexual harassment.
208. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 714.
209. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 715. Judge Posner’s choice of the word “siren” is seemingly deliberate. In a prior Seventh Circuit opinion authored by the Chief Judge, the
term is so offensive that the Seventh Circuit has previously held that calling a woman
a “siren” can be the basis for a sexual harassment claim. See McDonnell v. Cisneros,
84 F.3d 256, 259–60 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Unfounded accusations that a woman
worker is a ‘whore,’ a siren, carrying on with her coworkers, a Circe, ‘sleeping her
way to the top,’ and so forth are capable of making the workplace unbearable for the
woman verbally so harassed, and since these are accusations based on the fact that
she is a woman, they could constitute a form of sexual harassment.”).
210. The court’s one example of “relevant” conduct by a “mature” adolescent plaintiff
relies upon a familiar binary between an underage “siren” versus an innocent and
naı̈ve young worker. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 715. The image of a “siren” is a
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Given the endorsement of an adolescent worker’s “siren”-like qualities
as relevant evidence, the “siren” exception effectively eviscerates any protection of the Oberweis Dairy holding.211 Endorsing the inquiry into the “maturity” of an individual adolescent plaintiff for the damages phase to
decipher “causal contribution” instead of the liability phase is an operative
distinction without a difference. Discovery is rarely bifurcated, so the adolescent victim is effectively on trial throughout the case. Instead of avoiding
inquiries into the relative “maturity” of individual teenagers, the “siren” caveat endorses fishing expeditions into the sexual maturity of the minor
employee.212
Tellingly, Oberweis Dairy demonstrates how law constructs race and
gender. Indeed, the court undermined its articulated goals underlying the
special bright-line “welcomeness” test for adolescent workers. Allowing inquiry into the adolescent worker’s “siren”-like qualities certainly does not
further state policy to protect minor workers, nor does it simplify employment discrimination litigation.
Legal construction analysis explains the Oberweis Dairy opinion. Reification is certainly at work: The embedded construction of Black women as
“unworthy” and White women as “worthy” have left us in a place where it
is natural to make such distinctions about a woman’s character instead of
asking whether or not she was harassed and focusing on the conduct of the
woman who is cunning, overtly sexual, dishonest. She is not fully human, but is part
bird, and not capable of being raped. Her actions divest men of their free will,
leading (through no fault of their own) to their demise and destruction.
211. See Drobac, I Can’t to I Kant, supra note 8, at 685:
[W]hile the [Oberweis Dairy] court did not close the door completely to
money damages, it did invite a trial of the plaintiff’s conduct on the matter. . .The court did not elaborate on what evidence defense counsel might
introduce to prove that an ice cream scooper was a ‘siren.’ Nor is the opinion clear on why a sixteen-year-old might be a ‘siren’ while a twelve-yearold experiencing similar conduct would not. One can anticipate, however,
the chilling effect that this ruling may have on ‘consenting’ underage teens
and their parents who want to protect them from further trauma.
212. The court’s reliance on the Restatement Second of Torts for the legal proposition
that employers should only be liable for the amount of damages proximately caused
by their conduct in adolescent worker cases is unconvincing for two reasons. First,
the Oberweis opinion recognized that courts generally decline to use a comparative
fault defense to damages in Title VII cases since it risks “blaming the victim.”
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 714–15. The Oberweis court found the instant case
“unusual” because Doe was an “active participant” in pursuing a relationship with
the manager. Id. at 715. So bothered by evidence that the plaintiff fit into a historical construction of race and gender deeming her unworthy of legal protection, the
court created a fantasy brightline test where adolescent workers cannot “welcome”
sexual advances (and sexual maturity is not evaluated), while simultaneously making
the sexual maturity of the adolescent worker the critical inquiry. See id.
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alleged harasser. Reification explains the Seventh Circuit’s willingness to
protect the “blushing violet” and punish the “siren.” Protecting the “siren”
is not a legal necessity, even if she is a young girl who may not possess the
work experience or maturity to make an informed decision.
Categorization is also present. As discussed above, the protected category of “sex” embeds racist and subordinating constructions of a racial hierarchy preserved by Title VII, which positions White men on top and Black
women at the bottom. When race is seemingly taken out of the equation
(the most obvious example being a case between a White harasser and victim), race still constructs gender, and the law still constructs both. The
victim has to litigate a character portrayal that generates legal protection.
Finally, transcendence is at work. As discussed above, the Meritor
court deployed the “speech/dress” phrase as a proxy for the worthy/unworthy binary in recognizing the hostile work environment cause of action.
Here, the loaded phrases from Oberweis are many: “causal contribution,”
“sexual maturity,” etc.—all cloaks to allow the worthy/unworthy binary and
racial and gender hierarchies to persist.
B. EEOC v. V & J Foods: Alteration of the Employer’s Affirmative Defense
The Seventh Circuit evaluated another sexual harassment claim
brought by an adolescent worker in EEOC v. V & J Foods.213 The EEOC
alleged that Anthony Wilkins, manager at a Burger King owned by the
defendant, sexually harassed Samethia Merriweather.214 Wilkins, who was
apparently having sex with several employees at the restaurant, focused on
Merriweather since she was a “young girl” with a body that was not “all
used up.”215 Wilkins would rub against Merriweather and try to kiss her.216
He offered to pay her for sex, commenting that she should not give away
her body to her boyfriend “for free” when he was willing to pay her.217
Merriweather refused her manager’s advances, but felt that she was working
with a “stalker.”218
The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Merriweather was a bad employee,219 and claimed she was lying about her allegations due to being angry about her work schedule.220 V & J’s Statement of
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

507 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007).
EEOC v. V & J Foods, 507 F.3d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 2007).
V & J Foods, 507 F.3d at 577.
V & J Foods, 507 F.3d at 577.
V & J Foods, 507 F.3d at 577.
V & J Foods, 507 F.3d at 577.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, EEOC v. V & J Foods, No. 05-C0194, 2006 WL 3203713 (E.D. Wis. 2005), ECF No. 44.
220. Id. at 3.
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Undisputed Facts in support of its motion is rife with characterizations of
Merriweather as from the “ghetto,” deceitful, opportunistic, and sexually
promiscuous.221 The defendant first argued that Wilkins’ actions were not
actionable as harassment because the alleged harassment was not severe, and
Merriweather was not subjectively offended by Wilkins’ advances.222
Next, the defendant focused on the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense,223 arguing that the company had preventative policies/procedures in
place and that Merriweather failed to report the harassment.224 Citing
Oberweis Dairy, the district court rejected V & J’s argument that Wilkins’
alleged conduct did not constitute actionable harassment.225 There was little
dispute that Merriweather considered Wilkins’ conduct unwelcome, and
there was no allegation of sexual intercourse.226 Thus, the district court was
not bound by Oberweis Dairy’s bright-line rule governing welcomeness.
However, the district court imported the reasoning underlying the Oberweis
Dairy analysis to deny summary judgment on the balance of the prima facie
case: the age disparity between Wilkins and Merriweather, Wilkins’ “repeated physical contact” with Merriweather, and his “direct solicitation of
sex” pushed the case over the line on the prima facie case for hostile work
environment harassment.227
The case was not to proceed to trial, however, because the district
court upheld V & J’s reliance upon the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
and did not find a genuine issue of material fact on the retaliation claim.228
The portion of the district court opinion analyzing the Ellerth/Faragher defense reads more like an order after a bench trial than a summary judgment
decision. The court described Merriweather as an irresponsible employee;
although she testified that the sexual harassment policy was not explained
during orientation, the court focused on the fact that she was “obligated” to
221. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Uncontroverted Material
Facts at 2–3, 5, 7–8, EEOC v. V & J Foods, No. 05-C-0194, 2006 WL 3203713
(E.D. Wis. 2005), ECF No. 44-10.
222. Id. at 5.
223. Id. at 10–11.
224. Id.
225. EEOC v. V & J Foods, No. 05-C-0194, 2006 WL 3203713, at *6–7 (E.D. Wis.
Nov. 3, 2006).
226. V & J Foods, 2006 WL 3203713, at *2.
227. V & J Foods, 2006 WL 3203713, at *7.
228. The district court granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim in part on the
grounds that Merriweather could not allege retaliation based on a report of harassment by her mother. V & J Foods, 507 F.3d at 577 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh
Circuit reversed this holding as well, finding that in cases involving minor workers, a
parent may act as a child’s agent in engaging in a protected activity such as reporting
harassment. Id. at 580–81.
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review the handbook.229 The court rejected her informal complaints to shift
supervisors and assistant managers as unreasonable as a matter of law.”230
Perhaps persuaded by V & J’s characterization of Merriweather as deceitful
and opportunistic, the court characterized her attempt to report the harassment to visiting executives as calculating and cunning.231 In evaluating Merriweather’s allegation that an assistant manager gave her the wrong number
at corporate headquarters to report harassment, and was unable to provide a
correct one, the district court concluded, “[i]t does not matter that the
number ended up being incorrect. A reasonable person in Merriweather’s
position should have pursued the matter further and discovered the correct
number.”
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court opinion,
characterizing the trial court’s weighing of disputed facts on summary judgment as “simply wrong.”232 In another opinion authored by Judge Posner,
the court altered an employer’s reliance on the Ellerth/Faragher defense for
sexual harassment claims brought by adolescent workers. On the first prong,
the Seventh Circuit held that an adolescent employee’s reasonable actions
must be evaluated considering the “capabilities of the class of employees in
question.”233 On the second prong of the affirmative defense, the Seventh
Circuit held that employers must tailor their complaint procedures to the
understanding of their workforce:
An employer is not required to tailor its complaint procedures to
the competence of each individual employee. But it is part of [an
employer’s] business plan to employ teenagers, part-time workers
often working for the first time. Knowing that it has many teenage employees, the company was obligated to suit its procedures
to the understanding of the average teenager. Here as elsewhere
in the law the known vulnerability of a protected class has legal
significance.234
C. District Court Stabilization
Taken together, the Seventh Circuit’s adolescent-specific framework
for litigating sexual harassment cases brought by teenage workers had potential to deconstruct (or at least de-stabilize) race and gender hierarchies. So
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
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2006 WL 3203713, at *7.
2006 WL 3203713, at *7–8.
2006 WL 3203713, at *8.
507 F.3d at 578.
507 F.3d at 578.
507 F.3d at 578 (citations omitted).
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far, only two cases have been litigated under the Seventh Circuit’s adolescent-specific framework for sexual harassment cases brought by teenage
workers. Both demonstrate the power of the law to maintain, rather than
deconstruct, gender and racial hierarchies.
1. Fenton v. Portillo’s Hog Dogs
The first case was Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, an unreported case in
the Northern District of Illinois.235 Fenton was a sixteen-year-old teenager
who sued her former employer, Portillo’s Hot Dogs, for sexual harassment.236 She alleged one of the restaurant’s managers, Terence Murphy,
harassed her repeatedly during her few months of employment.237 Specifically, Murphy rubbed up against plaintiff, placed his hand in her pocket in
order to stroke her private parts, touched her lips, asked for a kiss, and told
Fenton she was “sexy.”238
Fenton waited six weeks before reporting Murphy’s conduct to another manager at the restaurant.239 Even then, Fenton only reported what
Murphy was doing when another manager noticed she appeared upset and
asked about it.240 Fenton claimed Murphy, who weighed about 300 pounds
and was over six feet tall, was very intimidating.241 In investigating Fenton’s
allegations against Murphy, the restaurant discovered three additional young
female employees who claimed Murphy had behaved inappropriately, and a
prior warning in Murphy’s file about inappropriate sexual comments towards an employee at another store.242 It took several weeks for the restaurant to complete its investigation of Murphy; he was allowed to continue as
store manager during that time period but was instructed to minimize his
contact with Fenton and the other female employees.243 Fenton resigned
235. Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, No. 07-cv-01686, 2008 WL 4899533 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
13, 2008).
236. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *1.
237. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *1.
238. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *1.
239. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2.
240. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ 22, Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, No. 07-cv-01686, 2008 WL
4899533 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2008), ECF No. 40 [hereinafter Defendant’s Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts].
241. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2.
242. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2; Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, supra note 240, at ¶ 44 (describing allegations that Murphy rubbed himself
against one young female worker’s buttocks and asked another if she wanted “to see
how big his dick” was).
243. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *4.
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before the investigation was complete.244 Murphy was later fired.245 Fenton
refused to return to work or cooperate further with the restaurant’s
investigation.246
The sole issue before the court on Fenton’s sexual harassment claim
was the applicability of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.247 The district court was tasked with evaluating the V & J Foods test. On the first
prong, the court held the employer’s policies sufficient under Ellerth/
Faragher as a matter of law without analyzing, as required by the new Seventh Circuit standard articulated in V & J Foods, whether those policies
were suited to Portillo Hot Dog’s largely adolescent workforce.248 Notably,
none of the young women at the restaurant came forward to report Murphy’s actions unprompted. Fenton only reported the alleged harassment to a
manager when directly asked.249 Several young women reported Murphy
having engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct, but only during direct
questioning in the restaurant’s investigation of Fenton’s allegations.250 The
court may have found Portillo’s harassment policies reasonable as a matter
of law,251 but in reality, it is clear the restaurant’s policies were not effective
at preventing the harassment of these young women.
In evaluating the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, the Portillo’s Hot Dogs court concluded the plaintiff acted unreasonably because she delayed reporting the physical contact, refused to return to
work after the manager was fired, and refused to meet the district human
resources manager at an off-site location to assist the investigation.252 The
court cited, but seemed not to consider, Fenton’s claim of being intimidated
by Murphy, or any of his efforts to intimidate her once she reported the
harassment.253 Fenton alleged that Murphy would intentionally bump into
her, frown and glare at her, and reduce her hours; the court simply dismissed these claims as “incidental contact.”254 Therefore, despite the V & J
244.
245.
246.
247.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2.
Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *4.
Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2.
The Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense was the only basis of Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1, Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, No. 07-cv-01686, 2008 WL 4899533
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2008), ECF No. 39 [hereinafter Defendant’s Brief in Support].
Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *5.
Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, supra note 240, at ¶ 21.
Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, supra note 240, at ¶¶ 42-44.
Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *5.
Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *6.
Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2.
Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2.
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Foods directive, the court failed to consider whether Fenton’s actions were
reasonable in light of the capabilities of Portillo’s adolescent workforce.255
In sum, the court failed to analyze, as contemplated by V & J Foods,
how the Elleth/Faragher defense should accommodate and respond to an
adolescent workforce. Instead, the Portillo’s Hot Dogs court simply reinvigorated the existing framework for adult workers.
To fully understand how legal construction shaped the Portillo’s Hot
Dogs decision, it is useful to look beyond the court’s dismissive treatment of
Fenton to the court records underlying the dispute. Once examined, a different picture of Fenton emerges. Tellingly, there is reason to question the
trial court’s conclusion that Fenton acted unreasonably. Both managers at
the restaurant, one who was the harasser, were male.256 Fenton testified she
feared Murphy might “do something” to her if she reported the harassment.257 Fenton was moved to a different area of the restaurant but still
came into contact with Murphy three to four times a week, and she testified
he made “intimidating and scary” faces at her and told other employees that
she was “lying” and “backstabbing.”258 Frustrated with the restaurant’s inaction, Fenton and her parents visited the local police, who went to the restaurant to investigate.259 Fenton testified that she resigned because she was
humiliated, embarrassed, and “terrified.”260 Murphy knew where Fenton
lived and had called her at home previously.261 After the police visit, the
district manager continued the restaurant’s investigation and terminated
Murphy.262 Fenton’s mother would not allow her to attend an off-site meeting alone with the district human resources manager when other employees
alleging concerns about Murphy were interviewed at the restaurant.263 None
of the context for Fenton’s actions made it into the court’s opinion or the
resulting characterization of her as unreasonable.
255. Fenton, 2008 WL 4899533, at *2.
256. Plaintiff’s Answer Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, No. 07-cv-01686, 2008 WL 4899533
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2008), ECF No. 48 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition].
257. Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition, supra note 256, at ¶ 4; Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement
of Facts, Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, No. 07-cv-01686, 2008 WL 4899533 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 13, 2008), ECF No. 49 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement of Facts].
258. Appendix to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, No. 07-cv-01686, 2008
WL 4899533 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2008), ECF No. 41–6.
259. Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition, supra note 256, at ¶ 2; Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement
of Facts, supra note 257, at ¶ 13.
260. Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement of Facts, supra note 257, at ¶ 25.
261. Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement of Facts, supra note 257, at ¶ 10.
262. Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition, supra note 256, at ¶ 2.
263. Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement of Facts, supra note 257, at ¶ 31.
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Invisible from the court opinion, but explicit in the party’s arguments,
is the defendant’s portrayal of Fenton as an opportunist interested only in
money damages.264 Fenton testified, however, that she retained an attorney
only after reporting the harassment to Portillo’s and reporting Murphy’s
conduct to the police for assistance.265 A broad reading of V & J Foods
would arguably require a court to analyze whether Fenton and her parents
acted reasonably given the “vulnerability” of Fenton as an adolescent
worker.266 Instead, the Portillo’s Hot Dogs court simply reincorporated the
adult framework as its corollary maintenance of race and gender
hierarchies.267
As an unreported case with little precedential value, however, the Portillo’s Hot Dogs opinion is most important as an illustration of the process of
legal construction. Faced with a plaintiff that the court judged in some ways
undeserving (perhaps because she hired an attorney), the court simply ignored the mandate of precedent. Specifically, the district court used the
concept of “reasonableness” in the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to perpetuate racial and gender hierarchies through transcendence. The reasonableness inquiry here allows racism and sexism to
transcend history despite the Seventh Circuit’s directive in V & J Foods that
courts should contextualize the inquiry and scrutinize the “capabilities” of
the adolescent in question.
2. EEOC v. Taco Bell & EEOC v. Management Hospitality of Racine
In EEOC v. Management Hospitality of Racine,268 the EEOC brought
an enforcement action against the owners of an International House of Pancakes in Racine, Wisconsin, based on the claims of two adolescent female
waitresses.269 Before the district court, the case on plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims proceeded directly from discovery to trial.270 Thus, while the
264. See Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, supra note 240, at ¶ 52
(“Fenton and her parents had decided to get a lawyer rather than continue to cooperate with Portillo’s investigation.”) (record citations omitted); Defendant’s Brief in
Support, supra note 247, at ¶ 15 (accusing Fenton of rushing to litigation).
265. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, supra note 240, at ¶ 27.
266. EEOC v. V & J Foods, 507 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2007).
267. See Fenton v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, No. 07-cv-01686, 2008 WL 4899533, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2008).
268. EEOC. v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, 666 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 2012).
269. Racine, 666 F.3d at 427.
270. See Decision and Order, EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d 802
(E.D. Wis. 2010) (No. 06-cv-0715), ECF No. 87 (order denying Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment); Order, EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, 780
F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (No. 06-cv-0715), ECF No. 88 (order for trial to
begin Nov. 16, 2009); Court Minutes of Trial, EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine,
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trial court was bound by the precedential framework established by the Seventh Circuit in Oberweis Dairy and V & J Foods, the trial court did not have
the opportunity to evaluate the issues as a matter of law before trial.
After a trial in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, a jury found the
defendants liable for sexual harassment.271 The defendants filed a post-trial
motion for judgment as a matter of law.272 First, the trial court rejected, and
the Seventh Circuit upheld, the defendants’ argument that the evidence
failed to support a jury finding that the harassment was severe and pervasive
as a matter of law.273 Both young women were subjected to frequent verbal
abuse and inappropriate sexual touching.274 Second, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s rejection of the defendants’ reliance on the Ellerth/
Faragher affirmative defense.275 Citing V & J Foods in analyzing the first
prong of the affirmative defense, the Seventh Circuit found that the restaurant failed to “provide a clear path for reporting harassment.”276 The Seventh Circuit did not specifically analyze V & J Foods on the second prong of

271.
272.

273.
274.

275.
276.

780 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (No. 06-cv-0715), ECF No. 144 (minutes of
first day of trial held on Nov. 16, 2009). Defendants had unsuccessfully moved for
partial summary judgment on two grounds: (1) punitive damages; and (2) retaliatory
discharge of one of the young women. Defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment, EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Wis.
2010) (No. 06-cv-0715), ECF No. 70.
Racine, 666 F.3d at 427.
Racine, 666 F.3d at 431. Since the trial court was bound by the Seventh Circuit
precedent set in Oberweis Dairy, the jury could not consider whether either of the
girls “welcomed” sexual advances, since both were under the Wisconsin age of majority. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2006). And, in order
to take advantage of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, the restaurant had to prove it complied with the V & J Foods standard. EEOC v. V & J Foods, 507 F.3d 575, 579–80
(7th Cir. 2007). It does not appear, from a review of the post-trial briefing, that
Defendants ever argued that the young women “welcomed” the alleged harassment.
See generally Defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, EEOC v. Mgmt.
Hosp. of Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (No. 06-cv-0715), ECF
No. 70.
Racine, 666 F.3d at 432.
Racine, 666 F.3d at 429–30. The young women testified at trial they were subjected
to a litany of harassing comments such as “I want to take you in the back and fuck
you over the pancake batter,” and “I bet you’re kinky.” The manager told one young
worker he wanted to “eat her out” and “do her from behind.” He left one a
voicemail message asking to “hook up” with her and also groped both girls on their
breasts and buttocks, pulled one’s ponytail while saying “you like it rough.” Id.
Racine, 666 F.3d at 435–37.
Racine, 666 F.3d at 436. It is questionable whether the employer’s policies in Racine
would have been sufficient as a matter of law even under the adult framework given
evidence that restaurant management failed to elevate the young women’s reports of
harassment, the sexual harassment training offered by the restaurant was “inadequate,” and the restaurant delayed beginning its investigation for several months
after the first complaint of harassment. See id. at 435–36.
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the affirmative defense, but did find both young women acted reasonably in
reporting the harassment.277
Faced with egregious facts, the protective Seventh Circuit framework
for adjudicating cases brought by adolescent workers, and a negative jury
finding, the Management of Racine defendants retreated to familiar territory in their post-trial motion—arguing that one of the plaintiffs was not
the type of woman who could experience sexual harassment. The defense
argued that one of the plaintiffs could not have been subjectively offended
by the harassment.278 First, the teen worker testified in her deposition that
she was initially “flattered” by the manager’s attention.279 Second, she
posted a video of young males “masturbating” on the social networking site
Myspace.com and commented the video was “funny as hell.”280 Both the
district and the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument.281 The
Seventh Circuit observed, “sharing jokes with friends in an online community is vastly different than being propositioned for sex by a supervisor at
work.”282
The implications of the Management Hospitality of Racine defense
strategy are important when considering that the supposed goal of the Seventh Circuit standard is to protect adolescent workers. Because the case was
litigated in the Seventh Circuit, the defendants were unable to argue this
young woman welcomed the manager’s advances under Oberweis Dairy.
The “welcomeness” bar also meant that the defendants were unable to take
advantage of the approach endorsed by Meritor—that a plaintiff’s sexually
provocative speech or dress are relevant context for the welcomeness inquiry.
As discussed above, Meritor’s “sexually provocative speech” inquiry is a classic example of legal construction as transcendence in sexual harassment law;
the neutral phrase allows historical racial and gender construction to experience continued viability in the law.
Although the strategy ultimately failed in the Management Hospitality
of Racine case, perhaps because of the horrible evidence of sexual harassment
involved, the viability of the strategy has been endorsed by the Oberweis
Dairy court’s “siren” exception. The hole opened by the Oberweis Dairy
court on damages has clearly widened the prima facie bar for hostile work
277. Racine, 666 F.3d at 437.
278. Defendant’s Brief in Support of FRCP 50(b) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law or Alternatively for a New Trial or Remittitur at 25-26, EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp.
of Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (No. 06-cv-0715), ECF No. 174.
279. EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810-11 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
280. Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
281. Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 811; EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, 666 F.3d 422, 433
(7th Cir. 2012).
282. Racine, 666 F.3d at 433 (quoting Racine, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 811).
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environment claims to include the subjective offense prong. Legal construction as reification means cases brought by adolescent workers will be litigated in ways that invoke historical racial and gender hierarchies.
IV. A DECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK
A. What About Natasha?
This section returns to the narrative of Natasha, who faced a difficult
litigation experience in bringing her workplace sexual harassment claim
against her former employer, Taco Bell, and against the convicted rapist
whose child she bore. There were many troubling themes evident in
Natasha’s experience with workplace sexual harassment, themes that have
been well explored by legal scholarship. For example, although her manager
eventually pled guilty to forcible rape, she initially failed to report the rape
to the criminal authorities or her employer; the EEOC only discovered the
incident when investigating another harassment allegation against the same
manager. This Article, however, sought to explore the legal experience of
adolescent workers bringing workplace sexual harassment claims, like
Natasha, as well as the ways the law affirmatively constructs race and gender
hierarchies. I argued that this legal construction of race and gender affects
adolescent workers in their ability to remediate hostile work environment
claims.
As it stands, even the more protective Seventh Circuit approach under
Doe v. Oberweis Dairy and EEOC v. V & J Foods would have left Natasha
vulnerable had the case proceeded to trial instead of settlement. Recall that
Taco Bell obtained deposition testimony that Natasha had sex with another
teenager before being raped by Terence Davis. The defense for Taco Bell
also sought to introduce evidence that Natasha pled guilty to a misdemeanor shoplifting charge and was involved in an assault incident that did
not lead to criminal charges. Ultimately, Taco Bell argued that Natasha welcomed Davis’ sexual advances. Applying the Oberweis Dairy approach, Taco
Bell would be precluded from making the argument, as a matter of law, that
Natasha welcomed sexual advances from Davis, a manager 18 years her senior.283 Since Natasha was under Tennessee’s age of consent of 18, she could
283. Oberweis Dairy fixed a teenager’s ability to “welcome” sexual intercourse to the jurisdiction’s age of consent. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2006).
Tennessee, the state where Natasha lived, worked and was raped, has a tiered statutory rape scheme dividing the categorizing the offenses into three categories based on
the age of the victim and relative age of the defendant: mitigated statutory rape,
statutory rape, and aggravated statutory rape. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506(c)
(Westlaw through end of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess.) Applying the current statutory
rape statute to an otherwise “consensual” sexual relationship between a 16-year-old
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not welcome Davis’ sexual advances.284 However, the Oberweis Dairy “siren”
exception leaves Natasha exceedingly vulnerable when seeking to establish a
prima facie case for hostile work environment sexual harassment. First, the
Oberweis Dairy “siren” exception means Taco Bell could seek to establish
that Natasha was a sexually mature adolescent responsible for her own
harm. The strategy used by the Racine defendants is another possibility—
Natasha has her own criminal history, was not credible, and could not have
subjectively been harmed by Davis’ advances. The reality of Taco Bell’s litigation strategy, which focused on painting Natasha as unworthy, is
preserved.
Even if Natasha could establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment harassment, Taco Bell retains an argument that Natasha acted unreasonably. Although V & J Foods required companies to tailor policies and
procedure to the understanding of the company’s adolescent work force, the
district courts have failed to enforce this mandate. And, as discussed above,
the transcendence of the historical racism and sexism embedded in the “reasonableness” inquiry leaves victims like Natasha, who never reported her
rape to her employer, vulnerable to dismissal under the Ellerth/Faragher
defense.
B. Deconstruction-Conscious Decisionmaking
A deconstruction framework is necessary for Natasha and other adolescent workers experiencing and bringing workplace sexual harassment
claims. Given the operation of legal construction, a deconstruction framework in the context of hostile work environment claims for adolescent
workers needs to counteract the process of reification, challenge legal construction through categorization and legitimization, and end the transcendence of social and legal constructions sustaining social hierarchies.
Law acts to construct race and gender through reification. Negative
stereotypes and controlling images have shaped the law and sexual harassment doctrine since the times of slavery. In turn, the law has functioned to
stabilize race and gender hierarchies. Through law, race and gender become
real, natural, inevitable, justified, and enforceable bases for subordination.
In modern sexual harassment doctrine, it seems natural to deprive sexual
harassment plaintiffs remedies based on personal behaviors and characteristics instead of a legal measure of the harassment. Instead of identifying and
punishing those who commit sexual harassment, the law identifies and disvictim and 34-year-old defendant would be considered aggravated statutory rape. See
id.
284. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506(c) (Westlaw through end of the 2014 Second Reg.
Sess.).
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ciplines certain workers judged incapable of experiencing sexual harm. As
shown, the current structure supports hegemony, not the remediation of
sexual harassment.
Law also acts to entrench race and gender by legitimizing the very
identity categories created in subordination. The Civil Rights Act was premised upon identity categories that are inherently subordinating and hierarchal. Embedded in the history of the addition of sex as a protected basis
under the act was the maintenance of racial and gender hierarchies.
Finally, law constructs race and gender by providing a vehicle for overt
racism and sexism to live on under the guise of neutral legal language and
tests. Within the context of sexual harassment doctrine, judicial inquiry into
a plaintiff’s speech and dress (under Meritor) or reasonable actions (under
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense) allow racist and sexist decisions to
be made, cloaked in neutral legal concepts.
One way to counteract legal construction is through deconstructionconscious decision-making. The phrase “deconstruction-conscious decisionmaking” is a somewhat lengthy term for a complex process with a very
precise goal, which is to disentangle the socio-historical constructions of
race and gender from legal doctrine in a way that dismantles, rather than
perpetuates, social hierarchies. It is a separate inquiry and analysis by first
acknowledging the way law constructs race and gender, and then seeking to
remediate that process by permanently dismantling racial and gender hierarchies going forward.
Using Oberweis Dairy as a hypothetical, this two-step deconstructionconscious decision-making would have: (a) acknowledged the ways sexual
harassment doctrine has constructed race and gender and rejected offending
precedent when attempting to craft a new protective framework for adolescent workers, and (b) once crafted, evaluated whether the new framework
would dismantle racial and gender hierarchies going forward. Had the court
done so, it is likely that the “siren” exception would not have been part of
the test, avoiding the familiar binary between the deserving and undeserving
plaintiff based on sexual maturity. The additional possibilities are even more
promising. Perhaps, at least for adolescent workers, the Oberweis Dairy
court could have led the movement away from Meritor’s speech/dress
inquiry.
Deconstruction-consciousness offers much improvement for V & J
Foods as well. There is good reason to dispose completely of the Ellerth/
Faragher defense in cases involving adolescent workers. At a minimum: (a)
the reasonableness of the adolescent plaintiff’s actions must be highly contextualized (e.g. to avoid the Fenton result), and (b) the V & J Foods standard should be strictly applied to require employers with a substantial
teenaged work force to tailor their policies and procedures. Had the V & J
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Foods court engaged in deconstruction-conscious decision-making, aimed at
acknowledging the legal construction of race and gender and dismantling
race and gender hierarchies, it is likely the results in Fenton and Racine
would have been much different.

